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Special Report 10

An Analytical Study Describing the Organizational Culture of the Army National Guard and Its Effects on Readiness


Joseph Galioto

December 1988



**United States Army Research Institute
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UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) ARI Special Report 10			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army Research Institute		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION		
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 5001 Eisenhower Avenue Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER		
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) An Analytical Study Describing the Organizational Culture of the Army National Guard and Its Effects on Readiness					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Galioto, J.					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Final		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) December 1988	
				15. PAGE COUNT 98	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION Doctoral thesis, University of Southern California					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) Readiness of the Reserve Components has been, and will continue to be, of major importance to Congress, the Department of Defense, and the military services. This is primarily due to the increased reliance on the Guard and Reserve by Congress and the Defense establishment in order to save money. The principal method used to determine military readiness within the Department of Defense is the readiness reporting system, which serves as a resource management tool that seeks to quantify the measureable variables such as equipment, training, and personnel. The system, however, does not address subjective variables such as morale, commitment, leadership, discipline, and cohesion that may affect a unit's combat performance. These variables are difficult, if not impossible to quantify and measure. Organizational culture, as a concept, has taken center stage as a major concern in organizational studies. It has become a widely acclaimed metaphor for understanding how organizations differ; how members develop bonding, or cohesion; and how members interact. It includes values, beliefs, norms, assumptions, and cohesiveness. ————— (continued)					
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Harry F. Crump			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (202) 274-8773		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL PERI-ZX

ARI Special Report 10

19. ABSTRACT (continued)

Utilizing the ethnographic approach, which emphasizes participant-observation, supplemented by survey research, this study examines the Army National Guard and suggests another way of viewing readiness, that is, through the lens of organizational culture.

The results imply that there is one pervasive military culture permeating both active and reserve components. However, within the Guard a sub-culture exists that has as its very core, a shared values system that places emphasis on the freedom of the citizen to pursue his/her own interests, while at the same time providing for the common defense of the community and nation: the citizen soldier.

ETHNOGRAPHY, Theses (TOM/AD)

**An Analytical Study
Describing the Organizational Culture
of the Army National Guard and Its Effects
on Readiness**

Joseph Galioto



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Department of the Army

December 1988

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DEDICATION

To my wife, Irene, whose love made it all possible.

FOREWORD

The approach to measuring Reserve Component readiness continues to be of interest at all levels. Focusing on the organizational culture of the Army National Guard provides a new dimension in studying Guard readiness and the importance individuals play in contributing to unit readiness. This study has application in the ARI research work program concerning unit training/performance factors used in combat training centers.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Edgar M. Johnson". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Edgar" being more prominent.

EDGAR M. JOHNSON
Technical Director, ARI,
and Chief Psychologist, U.S. Army

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express sincere appreciation to the many people who contributed to the planning and construction of the finished study, which began simply as an idea. The advice, guidance and motivation from Dr. Ronald J. Stupak were invaluable in the successful completion of the work. Many thanks go to Dr. Lawrence J. Korb and Dr. Warren H. Schmidt for their honest, constructive and professional judgements.

Appreciation is extended to Dr. Guy L. Siebold, Dr. Trueman R. Tremble, Jr., and Dennis Kelly of the Army Research Institute for their advice and invaluable assistance. And, many thanks to my colleagues, Travis Sample, Frank Gavin and George McAleer for their suggestions, advice and moral support.

I also want to express my appreciation and gratitude to the many Guardmembers who participated in this study, their names being too numerous to mention here. Also, a thank you to Lieutenant General Herbert R. Temple, Jr., Chief, National Guard Bureau, for his support and encouragement. I want to especially thank Colonel John P. Byrne, Comrade-in-Arms and close friend, for his advice and counsel throughout this study.

Finally, a special thanks to my wife, Irene, for all her help and encouragement, and my daughter, Nicole, for playing so quietly while Dad worked.

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AN ANALYTICAL STUDY DESCRIBING THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ITS EFFECTS ON READINESS

INTRODUCTION

Over the years the National Guard has been labeled a "refuge for draft dodgers,"¹ "amateur soldiers,"² "weekend warriors"³ and "part-time soldiers"⁴ who could never be combat ready. Reasons given run the gamut from lack of modern equipment to the limited training time available.⁵

As recent as September 1986, Major General Robert F. Wagner, the then Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) commander, charged that our reserve units, in particular, the Army National Guard, are not combat ready.⁶ Although the Army disavowed any ownership to Wagner's remarks, the press had a "field day" with the story. However, what was not emphasized was the fact that Wagner had also criticized the Active Army, as well. But, because the Department of Defense and Congress are relying more heavily on the Guard and Reserves in the Defense of our nation and more and more money is being targeted to these components, it seems logical that they would bear the brunt of any criticism concerning our defense capability. Thus, it was predictable that the Department of Defense would once again champion the Total Force Policy, which was the genesis of the change that brought the Guard and Reserves into the main stream of our nation's defense. James H. Webb, the then Assistant Secretary for Defense for Reserve Affairs, said in an interview soon after Wagner's comments: "There's no doubt in my mind that Guard units can fight. The active Army and Guard have done a tremendous job in improving training. . . ."⁷ Implied is that the Guard is, indeed, ready for combat. Yet, in an article appearing in the *Armed Forces Journal International* just a few months earlier, Webb had been reported as stating that personnel readiness, which relates to the number of people with the required skills, is lower in the Guard and Reserve, particularly throughout the combat service support area.⁸ Combat Service Support units, for the most part, are located in the Army Reserve and perform logistic or administrative functions necessary to support the operations of combat arms units such as infantry. However, the main theme of the article was the political influence wielded by the Guard and Reserve. For example, Webb was reported as saying that Congress was more interested in purchasing equipment for the Guard and Reserve than addressing other politically sensitive readiness issues. "The kinds of things the Congress focuses on are the equipment sorts of questions," he said, "but, they're also easier to handle in the Congressional environment."⁹

Thus, there appears to be political nuances attached to readiness that may camouflage perceived dollar savings associated with shifting roles and missions of the active forces to the Reserve Components. For those seeking increased reliance on the Guard and Reserves as a means of saving money, Webb cautioned that there is a price tag associated with such reliance in terms of dollars spent to purchase new equipment.¹⁰ This had been earlier pointed out by Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, who commented that increases to the levels of activity of Guard units to the same tempo as active duty units is going to cost the same amount of money.¹¹ Korb also criticized the present readiness reporting system as being politicized in that "The party in power uses or tries to use it to say that the money is well spent, while the party out of power claims the opposite."¹²

Arguments concerning military readiness usually focus on the reporting system itself. This seems logical when one reflects that major budgetary decisions as well as strategic planning are dependent upon accurate assessment of our forces' combat readiness.

Criticisms of Guard and Reserve readiness have historically centered on two elements:

1. The way the Army measures readiness, such as quantifying various components such as the number and types of equipment; and

2. The amount of training time available.

In an article appearing in the *Wall Street Journal*, a retired Army Reserve colonel agreed with Major General Wagner's comments concerning readiness in the Reserve components and the active forces, and placed the blame on the way readiness is actually determined.¹³ He claimed that the particular readiness reporting system used by the Army is entirely too subjective, relying extensively on the unit commander's judgement.¹⁴ Other critics of Guard and Reserve readiness have said essentially the same thing, that the Guard, for example, does not have all the equipment it needs to be an effective combat force and the training time is so limited that members cannot be ready to fight and win on the battlefield.¹⁵

The term "readiness" in itself has caused considerable consternation to those seeking to understand and cope with military power. It is not easy to define. According to Martin Binkin from the Brookings Institution, for example, it is "... the potential of combat units to achieve their mission. . . ." and

... depends on the quantity and quality of resources (capital assets, men, material, and money to buy services) available in peacetime, as well as the capability to meet the expected surge in demand that would follow in sustained combat.¹⁶

Implied in this definition are the measurable factors of readiness mentioned earlier.

To date, discussions concerning readiness, particularly of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, have focused primarily on scientific management principles including attempts to measure costs and benefits attendant to various line items of the budget such as new weapons systems, training exercises, and equipment purchases and modernization. To attempt to quantify the contribution of these various elements to the unit's combat readiness oversimplifies what is in reality a very complex problem and totally ignores those immeasurable indicators of combat effectiveness within the Guard and Reserve that may ultimately make the difference on the battlefield. This is not to denigrate the present reporting system as it relates to measuring variables that constitute objectification of readiness, but rather suggests a supplementary lens with which to view readiness involving disciplined subjectivity coupled with a more integrated, comprehensive approach to readiness assessment. Military writers Roger A. Beaumont and William P. Snyder summed it up appropriately when they wrote:

However difficult to define and measure, military effectiveness can only be obtained through control of an increasingly complex system of people, machines, organizational structures, and operational doctrines. Effectiveness therefore depends heavily on how well the overall system is integrated.¹⁷

In our concern for effectiveness and efficiency, the overall objective of our fighting forces is usually overlooked. As military philosopher Karl von Clausewitz wrote, "The aim of war should be what its very concept implies--to defeat the enemy."¹⁸ In essence, then, the principles of scientific management must sometimes give way to other methods of evaluating a situation such as experience and intuition. In war, for example:

... one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. This is the point against which all our energies should be directed.¹⁹

This, then, is the essence of this dissertation--to describe those surrogate measures that should be included in the readiness assessment of our military forces that, together with the objective data, will more accurately predict the unit's performance on the battlefield. The intent is to heighten awareness of Congress, the Defense establishment and, in particular, the leadership of the Guard and Reserve to those unique elements that comprise the organizational culture of the unit, its veritable "center of gravity" which can significantly contribute to the combat readiness of the Guard and Reserve.

The approach used in this study of the Army National Guard's organizational culture is essentially holistic in the sense that there is a reliance upon survey research, personal visits, formal interviews, informal discussions,

and the author's personal experiences drawn from over twenty years of full-time service in the Army National Guard. This service is comprised of duty in the smallest infantry element, the fire team of an infantry squad, through company, battalion, brigade, division, and the national level--the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau.

Essentially, this study seeks answers to the following questions:

1. Is there a distinct Guard culture as opposed to the Active Component culture?
2. Does organizational culture affect unit readiness?

The answers to these questions may shed more light on the nature of the Guard and its role in the defense posture of this nation. Of course, many of the arguments contained in this study are also germane to the other reserve components as well. Thus, extrapolations from conclusions drawn may be made that are relative to reserve components, in general.

Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of the history of the National Guard, including much of the important legislative history surrounding its evolution. Its past as well as its present is explored, and its dual role, both as a military arm of the President of the United States, and its state role, is described.

Chapter 2 discusses readiness and the National Guard--how it is measured, what it entails, the problems associated with the current reporting system, and the ongoing debate concerning its credibility and effectiveness.

Chapter 3 reviews the literature on organizational culture. Specifically discussed are values, beliefs, assumptions and cohesiveness, or the bonding that cements members to the organization and its goals, as well as to each other.

Chapter 4 discusses the implications of leadership on organizational culture, the Guard and readiness. Results of interviews with both leaders and followers from the Guard are provided as well as a discussion of Guard commanders in terms of how they perceive their values, beliefs and roles in the Guard.

Chapter 5, Part 1, discusses the methodology, research design and the survey instrument utilized for the study. Part 2 continues the discussion but focuses on the interviews--what the Guard leaders and followers said. This is mainly accomplished through the stories they related.

Chapter 6 contains some conclusions drawn from the study and suggests areas that need to be emphasized by the Guard leadership, as well as the Department of Defense and Congress. Also included is a discussion of how this particular study impacts Public Administration.

Notes For Introduction

¹William H. Riker, *Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 99.

²Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 173.

³John K. Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1983), p. 222.

⁴Philip Gold, "What the Reserves Can--and Can't--Do," *The Public Interest* (Spring 1984):47-61.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶*The Army Times*, 29 September 1986, p. 3.

⁷*Ibid.*, 15 December 1986, p. 54.

⁸Michael Ganley, "Who's Guarding the Guard and Reserve," *Armed Forces Journal* (May 1986):64.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²Telephonic conversation with Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, 28 October 1987.

¹³William V. Kennedy, "Are US Reserves Ready to Fight?" *Wall Street Journal*, 25 September 1986, p. 30.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵Gold.

¹⁶Martin Binkin, *Support Costs In the Defense Budget: A Staff Paper* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1972), p. 4.

¹⁷Roger A. Beaumont and William P. Snyder, "Combat Effectiveness: Paradigms and Paradoxes," *Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military*, ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980), p. 36.

¹⁸Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 593.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

CHAPTER I A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

The Militia

The notion that all members of a community are obliged to support and defend the community dates back to the beginnings of history. It was the English and German model of the militia, however, that ultimately found its way to the American colonies in the early Seventeenth Century; a time that found militias providing the sole source of security for the colonies rather than a standing army. Among the reasons for maintaining a militia was the fact that according to historian Russel F. Weigley, "The American colonies . . . were much too poor to permit a class of able-bodied men to devote themselves solely to war and preparation for war."¹

The Army National Guard, as we know it today, evolved from those early militia units. In fact, three colonial regiments, the North, South and East Regiments organized in Massachusetts in 1636, are today the 181st Infantry, 182d Infantry, 101st Field Artillery and the 101st Engineer Battalion. These units are the oldest in the U.S. Army and rank fifth oldest in the world.² It was not until 1903, however, that the modern image of today's Guard began to emerge.

The Reorganization Act of 1903

This important piece of legislation replaced the 1792 Militia Act which had attempted to provide some guidelines to a loosely organized militia force. The Militia Act required all free white male citizens, aged 18 through 45, to perform militia duty which consisted, for the most part, of muster and training for a specified number of days each year.³ Members were required to furnish their own weapons, ammunition and equipment, and States were allowed to organize the militia to suit their individual needs. In effect, the control of the militia was divided between the national government and the States, which reflected the deep concern of our founding fathers for large standing armies.

The Reorganization Act of 1903, called the Dick Act after its namesake, Major General Charles Dick, senator from Ohio and a Guardsman, essentially paved the way for an organized militia which would be known as the National Guard. At the same time, it also provided for increased control over the Guard. If a state wanted part of the increased federal aid now available, units in that state had to pass inspection by Regular Army officers and meet specified unit strengths. The Act also required Guardsmen to attend 24 drills per year and five days of annual training. For the first time, there was federal pay for annual training, although not for drills. In addition, the Dick Act also provided that the National Guard of the individual states, now officially recognized as the organized militia in the context framed within the Constitution, was to be organized and trained in accordance with federal regulations and with weapons furnished by the Army.⁴ Thus, more federal aid to the state militia was also accompanied by more federal control.

The National Defense Act of 1916

This legislation was another milestone in the evolution of the National Guard because it provided for an even stronger militia organization. The President, under this legislation, now had the authority to prescribe the type of units each state should maintain, the organizational structure, strength and weaponry of the units, and to combine the units of each state into divisions, regiments, and other tactical units.⁵ The Act also provided that no officer might receive federal pay unless he passed tests of his physical, moral and professional fitness.⁶ Thus, although enlisted men might still elect their officers, these officers did not serve in units receiving pay until the War Department approved their commissions. In addition, the Act made qualifications for enlistments in the Guard the same as the Regular Army and permitted the Army to conduct physical fitness examinations of all

militiamen called into federal service. The Regular Army had finally acquired somewhat more control over the Guard than it had previously.

Another key element of the National Defense Act of 1916 was that it required Guardsmen to take a dual oath to both the United States, as well as to the State. Thus, the dual role of the Guard, that of its federal mission, and its unique state role, are actually embodied in sworn oaths of allegiance by all members.

Finally, the National Defense Act of 1916 not only gave the Army authority to supervise and inspect the Guard, it also authorized the Army to create its very own reserve component, one that would be totally responsive to its needs and not share any of its responsibilities with other entities such as the States. The Organized Reserve Corps, now called the United States Army Reserve, was given the responsibility for support missions such as medical, maintenance, logistics, and the like, while the Guard was essentially given the role of ground combat such as infantry, artillery, and armor. This concept, for the most part, has survived to this very day.⁷

The National Defense Act of 1916 as amended by subsequent legislation in 1920 and 1933 has proved to be one of the most important pieces of legislation effecting the history of the United States military. The Act, in fact, guaranteed the status of the various state militias as the Army's primary reserve forces. Since that eventful period, other legislation was passed over the years, which served to strengthen the Guard's role in the nation's defense while providing it with more and more resources.

The Guard's Role in Defense

Since passage of the 1916 Act, part of the Guard has been called to arms in every major conflict involving the United States, including Vietnam. For that war, the Administration had considered mobilizing large numbers of Guard members and Reservists, but the political decision that finally ensued was to refrain from a large mobilization. Instead, only 12,234 Army Guard members were called for duty. Of the 34 Army Guard units called, only eight were actually deployed.⁸ (The Air National Guard had 10,511 personnel called up and of those, only 2,000 were deployed.)

During World War I, the Guard supplied 17 combat divisions, or about 40 percent of the entire Expeditionary Forces. It was credited with piercing the Hindenburg Line, as well as helping smash through the Meuse-Argonne.⁹ Major Gerd von Rudstedt, a member of the German general staff during the war and a future field marshal in World War II, said, during an interview, that there were four U.S. divisions that the German high command had rated "superior" and four divisions rated "excellent." There were two Guard divisions in each category.¹⁰

During World War II, Guard units participated in 34 separate campaigns and numerous assault landings in both the European and Pacific Theaters of Operation. There were 148 presidential citations awarded to National Guard units for outstanding performance of duty in action, or for conspicuous valor or heroism. And, 20 Medals of Honor went to Guardsmen, along with 50 Distinguished Service Crosses, 48 Distinguished Flying Crosses, and more than 500 Silver Star Medals. Guard casualties during World War II totalled approximately 185,561.¹¹

During the Korean War, eight Guard divisions were mobilized. Of these, four remained in the United States, two went to Europe and two, the 40th from California and the 45th from Oklahoma, went to Korea where each were credited with four campaigns.¹² Of course, one of the factors that contributed significantly to the Guard's ability to take its place along side the active component was that members did not require as much training as conscripts. Thus, they could be on the front lines sooner than raw recruits. This is an important point to ponder, especially in today's environment where short-notice war is an ever-present possibility.¹³ In fact, in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO there will be little or no time available for the Guard and Reserve forces to undergo post-mobilization manning, equipping and training.¹⁴ Critics of the Guard and Reserve's ability to mobilize and deploy as required, such as Martin Binkin, claim that Reserve units cannot deploy as rapidly as can ac-

tive units for two reasons. First, the administrative process associated with mobilizing citizen-soldiers is formidable because of business, financial and family affairs needing to be resolved. And, second is the administrative delay caused by post-mobilization training being required before the Reserves can be deployed.¹⁵ This notion is reinforced by military writer Jon P. Bruinooge who commented on the problems associated with "this sort of overnight deployment"¹⁶ and the seven months of training that the two National Guard divisions deployed to Korea underwent before embarkation. Upon arrival, they required yet another seven to eight months of training before being committed to combat because they were deemed to be only 40 to 45 percent combat effective.¹⁷

The Army National Guard Today

The Army National Guard is the largest of the Ready Reserve components. As of the close of 1986, it had an all-volunteer paid strength of 438,413 with a strength goal for Fiscal Year 1987 of 462,000. Its budget in Fiscal Year 1986 was \$5 billion which, exclusive of weapons and equipment, accounted for 6.4% of the total Army budget.¹⁸ The Army National Guard is comprised of 3,600 units in 2,600 communities, forming 10 divisions, 18 combat arms brigades, 3 medical brigades, 4 armored cavalry regiments, 2 Special Forces Groups, and 17 major headquarters. Other Guard-unique capabilities and units include 4 anti-tank battalions equipped with TOW missiles, 5 scout battalions, 1 mountain infantry battalion, and 1 ROLAND air defense artillery battalion. Its overall contribution to the total Army structure is quite significant. For example, it is responsible for 36% of the Army's combat divisions, 66% of its separate brigades, 25% of the Special Forces units, 74% of the infantry battalions, 47% of the mechanized infantry battalions, 43% of the armored battalions, 57% of the armored cavalry regiments and 47% of the field artillery battalions.¹⁹ (For an overall review of the total contributions that the Army National Guard, as well as the Army Reserve, makes to the entire Army force structure see Table 1.)

As can be readily ascertained, the size and potential military power of the Army National Guard is formidable, indeed. Given the fact that it is now an equal partner, under the Total Force Policy, in the defense of this nation, it is no wonder that so much emphasis is given to readiness, in particular equipment and personnel strength. However, because the Guard is, in effect, a part-time Army, emphasis on training has been one of the highest priorities. To adequately prepare for its growing missions, members undergo considerable training to maintain proficiency. In fact, according to many Guard leaders, training during peacetime is the Guard's most important product.

How The Guard Trains

During the Forties and early Fifties, the Army National Guard trained for two hours, one night a week, 48 times a year. Interspersed throughout the year were three or four outdoor weekends for weapons qualifications. During the summer, there were two weeks of field training designed to train members to fight as integral units. Thus, emphasis was on squad or section-level training, platoon-level training, and so on. For many units, the ultimate objective was company level, and in some instances battalion level, training. But, because of certain limitations impeding training, such as shortages of personnel and equipment, many units could not advance beyond platoon-level training.²⁰

Today, Guard units perform approximately one weekend per month training and fifteen days of annual field training. However, in addition to the monthly training periods, there is a large number of weekly training assemblies scattered throughout the year that are used for training preparation, as well as logistical and administration activities. And, as a result of the Total Force Policy, the Guard is participating in many important programs that provide intensified training necessary for combat preparedness. For example, one such program establishes a close relationship between Guard units and similar active Army units which emphasizes training assistance and intensive evaluations aimed at increasing the readiness of Guard units. Under this program, Guard units "round out" active Army divisions and train with the units that they are structurally aligned with. All these programs have increased the training time spent by the average Guard member. According to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General Herbert R. Temple, Jr., the average Guard officer during 1985

TABLE 1
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG) AND ARMY RESERVE (USAR)
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL ARMY STRUCTURE*

Unit Types	ARNG % of Total Army	USAR % of Total Army	Combined % of Total Army
TOW Light Anti- Tank Infantry Battalions	100	0	100
Infantry Scout Troops	100	0	100
Heavy Helicopter Companies	100	0	100
Training Divisions	0	100	100
Training Brigades	0	100	100
Judge Advocate General Units	2	98	100
Railroad Units	0	100	100
Civil Affairs Units	0	97	97
Public Affairs Units	65	30	95
Pathfinder Units	46	46	92
Psychological Operations Units	0	87	87
Chemical Units - Smoke Generator	0	85	85
Infantry Battalions	74	7	81
Corps Support Groups HHC	17	62	79
Separate Brigades	66	10	76
Maintenance Companies	46	28	74
Army Hospitals (MTOE)	11	63	74
Supply and Service Units	31	40	71
Combat Engineer Units	43	25	68
Truck Companies	37	30	67
Engineer Bridge Companies (Non- Divisional)	48	19	67
Military Police Companies (Non- Divisional)	46	20	66
Medical Units (Other)	24	40	64
Conventional Ammunition Companies	17	44	61
Corps Signal Battalions	47	10	57
Watercraft Companies	7	50	57
Armored Cavalry Regiments	57	0	57
Field Artillery Battalions	47	8	55
Special Forces Units	25	25	50
Mechanized Infantry Battalions	47	2	49
Major Logistical Units	22	26	48
Armored Battalions	43	2	45
QM Petroleum, Oil & Lubricant Companies	0	45	45
Combat Divisions	36	0	36
Military Intelligence Units	3	28	31
Medium Helicopter Companies	11	11	22

*Reprinted from Annual Report of Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Year 1986.

NOTE: Percentages determined by counting like type units. Data as of September 30, 1986.

served nearly 80 paid duty days while enlisted soldiers trained on the average of 48.²¹ However, although members of the Guard are more involved today in increasing their proficiency through training for their combat role, there is also the other role that they must contend with, that of their State's missions and the time those missions entail.

The Dual Role of the National Guard

The role of the Guard today, as the descendant of the State Militia, is essentially a dual role--that of federal and that of state. The linchpin of the American military system, as articulated in the Constitution, was to be the militia. When the framers gave the Congress the power of "organizing, arming and disciplining" the militia, they were attempting to ensure that the experience during the Revolutionary War with poorly trained, armed and organized militia would not be repeated. It is within this backdrop that the modern Guard evolved. What constitutes the very fibre of the Guard's culture is the dual role that it enjoys. As a military organization, it is required to be ready for immediate service to the nation in case of war or national emergency. At the same time, it also has the mission of preserving peace, order and public safety in the respective states during local emergencies, but under the control of the governors. The federal government supervises military instruction, furnishes field training facilities, provides pay, uniforms, equipment and ammunition. It also contributes a fair portion of the expenses connected with the construction of armories. And, although the primary mission of the National Guard is its federal mission, it is the state mission that makes the Guard so unique. When the Guard is used in a non-federal role such as state emergencies, the command of the Guard is normally exercised through the Adjutant General, a qualified military officer appointed by the governor. This chain of command reaches through the Guard's military chain of command to the units.

The chain of command, however, does not extend to the National Guard Bureau. The Bureau, which is a joint staff agency of both the Army and the Air force, does not have command authority over its Army and Air Guard organizations. During peacetime, as mentioned previously, the governors control the Guard, when the Guard is not in federal status. That is, when Guard units are mobilized by the President, they fall under control of the Army and Air Force. Yet, the Chiefs of those services, as well as the Chief, National Guard Bureau, do, in fact, exercise a significant degree of administrative control over the Guard at all times. This is accomplished through inspections and training supervision and by the authority to withdraw federal recognition of units performing unsatisfactorily, and through allocation of financial and logistical support.

This brief review of the history and current status of the Army National Guard sets the stage for the next chapter, which will examine readiness issues. Readiness continues to be the main focus of Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Army leadership. The Reagan Administration has consistently pursued an extensive modernization and expansion of the U.S. Army forces. In an attempt to hold down personnel costs, the Army has planned large increases in its Selected Reserve Components, in particular the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. For example, manpower for the Guard and Reserve is projected to increase 116,000 or 16 percent, through Fiscal Year 1990.²² This increasing reliance upon the Guard and Reserve stems from the Department of Defense's Total Force Policy born in 1973, which increased the responsibilities of the Army National Guard and Reserve forces as partners with the active component in implementation of national security strategy. Is the National Guard ready to assume its role in the event of military emergency? More importantly, is the citizen-soldier concept a viable one for the successful defense of our nation *today*?

Notes For Chapter I

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⁶Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve 1908-1983* (Washington: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), pp. 28-29.

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⁹Bruce Jacobs, "Two Tours Under Pershing: The National Guard on the Mexican Border and in World War I," *National Guard* (Washington: National Guard Association of U.S., 1986), pp. 43-47.

¹⁰Ibid.

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¹³Jon P. Bruinooge, "Mobilization For a European War: The Impact of Habeas Corpus," *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force*, ed. Bennie J. Wilson, III (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985), pp. 217-256.

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¹⁵Martin Binkin, *U.S. Reserve Forces: The Problem of the Weekend Warrior--A Staff Paper* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 9.

¹⁶Bruinooge.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸*The National Guard Update* (Washington: National Guard Bureau, n.d.).

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²⁰Interviews.

²¹LTG Herbert R. Temple, Jr., "Profound Changes as National Guard Marks 350 Years," *Army*, vol 36, no. 10 (Washington: Association of U.S. Army, 1986), pp. 143-142.

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CHAPTER II READINESS IN THE GUARD AND RESERVE

Introduction

In his Annual Report to the Congress on the Fiscal Year 1988/1989 budget, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger stated that the Administration, since 1980, has upgraded significantly the combat capabilities of the Reserve Components.¹

Following the "first to fight, first to be equipped" policy, early deploying Army National Guard and Reserve units are receiving modern weapons systems before later deploying active-duty units.²

What this means is that, since the inception of the policy in 1973, those Guard and Reserve units scheduled to deploy in wartime earlier than other Guard and Reserve units would be equipped with the same priority as the early deploying active component units.³ This is particularly important since, in the event of a NATO-WAR-SAW Pact confrontation, current plans call for some reserve units to arrive in Europe during the first 30 days of conflict and the goal is to have most, if not all, reserve units scheduled to deploy to the European theater within 90 days.⁴

The focus of this chapter is on military preparedness and, in particular, combat readiness in the Army National Guard. The thrust is on the problems the military is experiencing in its efforts to define and quantify readiness and some of the shortfalls of the system in use today. In exploring the readiness system in use today, discussion will focus on process as opposed to content. Essentially, the way the Army determines readiness is the central point of this chapter, and not the various components that make up the criteria. For example, force structure and concomitant equipment is driven by U.S. commitments and one of the most important determinants of our conventional force posture, both active component and reserve, is the assumption made about the expected duration of a war in Europe.⁵ Should we be planning for a conventional war lasting months and maybe years, or should we assume that early negotiations or escalation to nuclear conflict would take place?⁶ These issues go beyond this study. Thus, emphasis in this chapter will be on how the Army measures readiness today in terms of numbers and kinds of resources required. What will become apparent is the lack of sufficient attention to those aspects of the military, in particular the Army National Guard, that are difficult to measure, yet have an impact on unit readiness.

The measurement of readiness has, by itself, presented problems for the Department of Defense and the military services for some time. Most of these problems are concerned with how to accurately depict the readiness status of the armed forces. In effect, the system used to report readiness has not been totally reliable.⁷ As a result of directions from Congress to strengthen the readiness reporting system, the Department of Defense and the military services have been studying methods of improving readiness reporting, with a continued emphasis on quantification.⁸ However, until readiness can be *qualified*, as well as *quantified*, the problems will continue. There are intangibles of military preparedness that one cannot quantifiably measure. The purpose of combat units is to deter aggression and if that fails, to fight and win on the battlefield.⁹ As military writer Lewis Sorley points out:

The nature of combat operations is such that intangible attributes of military forces, such as morale, discipline, commitment, leadership, and cohesion, are crucial determinants of the effectiveness of military forces. These qualitative factors are far more difficult to assess than quantitative measures of numbers of troops and weapons systems.¹⁰

They concern "people," and readiness evaluation, as constituted today, does not accommodate evaluation of the qualitative factor of quality of personnel.¹¹ What is needed is an objective approach tempered with principled subjectivity. But first, we need to understand what "readiness" is in the military sense of the term.

What Is "Readiness"?

The Army's mission, during peacetime, is deterrence--the preparation of field units to be ready to perform their wartime missions.¹² During war, the mission of the Army is to render the enemy's forces ineffective. As Secretary Weinberger stated:

America's basic defense strategy, as it has been for the entire postwar period, is to deter aggression. Our strategy seeks to safeguard U.S. interests by convincing adversaries not to commit aggression against those interests. It precludes an attack from happening in the first place through clear alliance commitments and ready forces that provide us with an effective and credible response to any level of aggression.¹³

The basic tenet of the deterrence policy is to discourage acts of aggression against the United States security interests and commitments by demonstrating a strong defense. However, the fundamental objective of our deterrent policy is to prevent nuclear war. Concomitant with that is building and maintaining weapons systems to accomplish this goal and the maintenance of a conventional fighting capability. This is particularly important given the nature of the threats to our national security which, of course, considers the Soviet Union "by far the most serious and the most immediate."¹⁴ Thus, military preparedness, or readiness, of our military forces have been and will continue to be the main focus of the Department of Defense and Congress, as well as the military services. Yet, over the years there has been considerable confusion concerning definitions, interpretations, and understanding of "readiness."¹⁵

It is vitally important to understand the concept of readiness and how the term has come to be used, and sometimes abused, if we are to commit a large portion of the defense budget and our nation's security to the belief that readiness can, indeed, be achieved through a greater reliance on the Guard and Reserve. What many people do not understand, according to the Department of Defense, is that readiness is just one pillar, albeit significant, of overall military capability. Thus, in order to understand readiness, one needs to first understand how it fits into the over-arching capability of our forces.¹⁶

Military Capability

Military capability, as defined by the Department of Defense, is "the ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, or destroy a target set)."¹⁷ It really cannot be measured without a thorough understanding of the interrelationship and interdependence of the four pillars that make up military capability. And, although each may be analyzed separately, a change in one usually affects the others. These four pillars are:¹⁸

1. Force Structure--The number, size, and composition of units which make up the defense forces. It is usually described in terms of numbers of divisions, ships, or wings.
2. Force Modernization--The qualitative, technical capabilities of weapons systems and equipment. Depending on the service, modernization may include fielding new equipment or fielding new and modified equipment.
3. Force Readiness--The ability of the force, units, weapons systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which they were designed. It is measured in terms of manning, equipping, and training the force and the ability of the force to mobilize, deploy, and employ without unacceptable delays. However, only through a separate analysis of each element contributing to the collective ability of the force to perform a wartime mission, can a level of readiness be inferred.
4. Force Sustainability--The staying power of our forces during combat operations. It represents the ability to resupply engaged forces with the replacement manpower, equipment, and other supplies during combat and the ability to move these resources to combat areas.

As can be readily ascertained, military capability is certainly a difficult concept to quantify and measure simply because it encompasses an evaluation, simultaneously, of the various components that comprise the four pillars. Yet, while it may be impossible to scientifically measure military capability in absolute terms, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do attempt to evaluate how well it could accomplish military missions by requiring the military services to conduct assessments of their force capability. In essence, the Department of Defense infers levels of capability by combining the results of evaluations of the military services' readiness, sustainability, force structure, and modernization using indicators appropriate to these elements of capability.¹⁹ The system that the Army uses to obtain such an assessment of the status of its units, including the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, in terms of their personnel, equipment, and training, is the Unit Status Reporting System and the Unit Status Report.²⁰

The Unit Status Reporting System

Essentially, the objectives of the Unit Status Reporting System are to provide the current status of the Army units to national command authorities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of the Army, and all levels of the Army chain of command.²¹ Additionally, it is intended to provide indicators that portray Army wide conditions and trends, identify factors which degrade unit status, identify the difference between current personnel and equipment assets in units and full wartime requirements, and to assist the Department of the Army and intermediate commands to allocate resources.²² Under this system, four distinct areas impact mission accomplishment of the unit. They are: (1) equipment and supplies on hand, (2) equipment readiness, (3) personnel, and (4) training.

Under the current reporting system in effect, the unit commander determines the overall status of his unit and its ability to accomplish assigned wartime missions. There are five rating categories:²³

C-1--Combat ready, no deficiencies. The unit has its prescribed levels of wartime resources and is trained so that it can be deployed. If outside the Continental United States (CONUS) it can perform its operational contingency mission.

C-2--Combat ready, minor deficiencies. The unit has only minor deficiencies in its prescribed levels of wartime resources or training. Its ability to perform the wartime mission for which it is organized, or tasked is limited. If in CONUS, a unit can be deployed, but minor additional training or resources is desirable. If outside CONUS, it can perform its operational contingency mission.

C-3--Combat ready, major deficiencies. The unit has major deficiencies in its prescribed levels of wartime resources or training. Its ability to perform its wartime mission is limited. It can deploy or execute its operational contingency mission at reduced levels, but normally it will be given additional training or resources to increase its readiness posture.

C-4--Not combat ready. The unit has major deficiencies in its prescribed wartime resources or training and its ability to perform its wartime mission. It requires major upgrading prior to deployment or employment in combat. However, if conditions dictate, the unit might be deployed or employed for whatever residual capability it does have. For example, a three-brigade division rated C-4 may be able to provide two fully-supported mission capable brigades.

C-5--Not combat ready, programmed. Due to Department of Army programs, the unit is not ready and does not have the prescribed wartime resources, or cannot perform its wartime mission. C-4 deployment and employment conditions apply. However, if conditions dictate, the unit might be deployed or employed for whatever residual ability it does have.

To summarize, readiness as one pillar of military capability involves the establishment of a number of varied conditions that must exist within a military unit in order for that unit to successfully accomplish the mission for which it is organized. Factors that enter into the equation include, among others, the manpower, equipment and training, both individual and unit level. Underpinning the whole concept of military capability and readiness is the explicit assumption that a unit with all its authorized resources, including trained personnel, is more likely to

accomplish its combat mission successfully, than one without resources. However, the unit commander, when preparing the Unit Status Report for his unit, *can upgrade the overall readiness rating of his unit subjectively, if he deems appropriate*, and if certain factors warrant such upgrade. These factors include the quality of leadership, morale, cohesion, and education level of unit personnel.²⁴ (This is one of the biases of the system alluded to earlier which tends to politicize the system, given the motivation and pressure for promotion on the part of the commander.) However, the variables above are not quantifiable, as are the other determinants of readiness, yet they do appear to be important to the readiness assessment process. Just how much weight these variables carry in the overall process of readiness reporting still remains an important question. Critics of the present readiness reporting system such as military writer Lewis Sorley are quick to point out that there are missing elements of readiness assessment:

... which are known or believed to be important components of unit readiness, especially interactive readiness, trained performance, competence of key personnel, the effect of disintegrative factors (turbulence, drug abuse, racial harmony, indiscipline, and alienation), commitment and cohesion, and the ways in which these multiple factors combine to produce a unit's state of combat readiness.²⁵

Even the Army, recognizing the difficulties with the Unit Status Report caution the use of the Report as the sole means of measuring unit readiness.²⁶

Readiness in the Guard

Over the past decade there has been an increased emphasis on Guard and Reserve readiness. It began as the result of implementation of the Total Force Policy, first promulgated by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in 1973, and since reaffirmed by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger. Basically, the Total Force Policy integrates the Guard and Reserve with the active components in our nation's defense instead of the Guard and Reserve being merely a back-up force for the active component in a military emergency, as they had been previously.²⁷ Thus, the goals and objectives of the Defense establishment since 1973 have focused on making the Guard and Reserve more ready. These objectives are attained by providing more and better equipment to the Guard and Reserve, and the means to better train their members so that they will be combat ready, in the event of a national emergency. Because of the constraints on the military budget and the political clout of the Guard and Reserve, the increasing reliance upon both has received considerable support from Congress and more and more missions are being transferred from the active components to the Guard and Reserve.

In one particularly important change, 10 active Army combat divisions were reduced in personnel and assigned reserve brigades and battalions as part of their force structure. This approach, termed the "Roundout" program is especially significant because for the first time active Army combat divisions are incomplete without concurrent mobilization of their reserve units. One significant consequence of this increasing reliance by the Army on the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve is that over 40 percent of all forces required during the first 30 days of a European conflict would now consist of reservists.²⁸ Concomitantly, in the event of full-military reinforcement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), one-third of the combat, and two-thirds of the combat support units in Europe would be provided by the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.

The Total Force Policy has been the subject of much debate over the years.²⁹ There are those who believe in a strong, active component force, rather than increasing reliance upon the Guard and Reserve, as the policy prescribes. There are those critics that claim the Reserve Components are a part-time force with limited training time available that could never be completely ready for combat without considerable further training after mobilization.³⁰ Then there are the proponents of the policy that believe that Guard and Reserve units "... have proved that if we can get them the resources, they can meet very stringent readiness standards."³¹

In Congress, Representative Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on military personnel is a strong defender of the Total Force Policy. In an article appearing in the *New York Times*, Aspin stated that:

Greater reliance on the National Guard and reserves becomes essential when you look at the constraints about to be imposed by deficits and demographics, [and] the Guard and the reserves must be improved through the assumption of more and important missions and modern equipment.³²

Representative G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery agreed with Aspin when he said in a *New York Times* article. "In my opinion one of the best means of accomplishing this (combat readiness of the military) is through reliance on our country's National Guard and Reserve Force."³³

And, finally, James H. Webb, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and currently the Secretary of the Navy, was quoted in another article appearing in the *New York Times* as saying, "... the United States Army cannot go to war--cannot go to war--without using the Guard and Reserves."³⁴

With all this obvious support for increasing reliance upon the Guard and Reserves on the part of Congress and the Department of Defense, it is no wonder that the subject of readiness is such an important and volatile issue. When critics of the Total Force Policy argue that the Guard and Reserves should not be relied upon as the primary back-up of the active establishment, the Guard and Reserve quickly respond by pointing to their capabilities and proven war record. For example, the Guard is quick to mention that "training up" which is an important Guard goal that places emphasis on higher-level training, is proving very successful.³⁵ Texas' 49th Armored Division, for example, became the third Guard division in two years to train as a fully deployed division in the field.³⁶ The 47th Division is planning similar training in Fiscal Year 1988 using satellite technology to link three widely separated training sites. The active Army's new 10th Mountain Division has a New York Army Guard brigade as a round-out partner. And, 69 percent of the Army Guard's field artillery units have successfully completed the 50-hour nuclear qualification evaluation in the last three years.³⁷

In terms of overseas training, Guard units from 32 states and territories (nearly 7,500 troops) combined efforts with the active Army, the Army Reserve, the Panama Defense Forces and the Army of Honduras to continue construction projects and military training that started in 1981. Through a variety of exercises during the past three years, Guard troops have been involved in rigorous and realistic engineer training, tropical medical training, and logistics over-the-shore training not available in the United States. Actual overseas deployment involved 469 Army Guard units and unit cells during Fiscal Year 1984, a total of 7,700 troops. In Fiscal Year 1985, there were 865 unit/cells, a total of 25,617 troops. In all, during Fiscal Year 1986, Army Guard troops trained in 35 foreign locations.³⁸

To summarize, it has become apparent that we do not wish to maintain a large standing Army and that increasing reliance upon the Guard and Reserve will be playing a more dominant role in our nation's defense than ever before. This was reinforced in an article appearing in the *Armed Forces Journal International* of May 1986 when the author wrote:

The increasing reliance on Guard and Reserve units in order to save money is a trend that undoubtedly will continue as it has over the past few years, [and] the U.S. may soon have to call on the Guard and Reserve forces far more than ever in the past.³⁹

If we can wade through the varied methods underlying attempts to scientifically quantify military readiness we may discover that there is the human element in the military capability equation that heretofore has been inadequately addressed. Clausewitz said, "There are the moral elements of war, of which the principal elements are: the skill of the commander, the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit."⁴⁰ These variables, as well as other classic indicators of military unit performance or effectiveness, such as morale, esprit de corps, elan, values and cohesion, are important to overall military effectiveness and the unit's ultimate success on the battlefield. And, it is within the culture of the organization that these variables reside.

In the following chapter, the concept of organizational culture in the military will be discussed. What will become apparent is the unique role of the citizen-soldier in our nation's defense and the potential of the Guard's center of gravity, its culture. It will also become evident that the Guard, because of its unique center of gravity, has the potential of creating a high degree of cohesiveness that can ultimately enhance the professionalism and competence of its leaders, who, in turn, can shape and manage their organization's culture. The resultant synergism serves to heighten and end-product--readiness.

A number of military writers have linked cohesion to readiness. For example, Sam C. Sarkesian postulates that for a unit to be combat effective, it must demonstrate readiness and cohesion.⁴¹ He defines "readiness" as "the level of technical proficiency of the unit and the operational state of the tools (i.e., weapons) and logistics it requires to perform its mission."⁴² Cohesion, for Sarkesian:

... refers to the attitudes and commitment of individual soldiers to the integrity of the unit, the "will" to fight and the degree to which these are in accord with societal values and expectations.⁴³

The concept of cohesion will be explored more fully in the next chapter. Suffice to say now that cohesion, as a critical component of the organization's culture, has not been addressed in readiness assessments of the military forces, to date. In fact, little has been published in the military establishment on organizational culture and its effect on military preparedness. What is "Organizational Culture"?

Notes For Chapter II

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⁵Martin Binkin, *U.S. Reserve Forces: The Problem of the Weekend Warrior--A Staff Paper* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 59.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷*Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Year 1986*, Office of Secretary of Defense, 1987, p. 3.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹LTG Herbert R. Temple, Jr., *Congressional Statement*, Second Session, 99th Congress, 1986.

¹⁰Lewis Sorley, "Prevailing Criteria: A Critique," *Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military*, vol. 9, ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980), p. 57.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²Department of the Army Field Manual Number 100-1 (PrePublication Edition, June 1986), p. 8.

¹³*Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Year 1986*, p. 15.

¹⁴Army Regulation 220-1, September 25, 1986.

¹⁵*Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Year 1986*, p. 3.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication #1, 1986).

¹⁸General Accounting Office, *Measures of Military Capability: A Discussion of Their Merits, Limitations, and Interrelationships*, June 13, 1985, No. B217229.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰Army Regulation 220-1, September 16, 1986.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²*Ibid.*

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵Sorley, p. 91.

²⁶Army Regulation 220-1, September 16, 1986.

²⁷Bennie J. Wilson, III, "Introduction," *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force*, ed. Bennie J. Wilson, III (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985), p. 1.

²⁸U.S. Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, *Improving the Army Reserves*, 1985.

²⁹Edward Philbin and James L. Gould, "The Guard and Reserve in Pursuit of Full-Integration," *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force*, ed. Bennie J. Wilson, III (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985), pp. 43-57.

³⁰Philip Gold, "What the Reserves Can--and Can't--Do," *The Public Interest*, Spring 1984, pp. 47-61.

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³²"Aspin Would Spur Military Reserves," *New York Times*, 27 February 1984, p. 14.

³³G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery, "Steps to Bolster Military Reserves," as quoted by Bill Keller, *New York Times*, 29 January 1985, p. A19.

³⁴James H. Webb, Jr., "Reserves Move to the Forefront of Defense," as quoted by Bill Keller, *New York Times*, 10 March 1985, p. E1.

³⁵*National Guard Update* (Washington: National Guard Bureau, n.d.).

³⁶*Ibid.*

³⁷*Ibid.*

³⁸*Ibid.*

³⁹Michael Ganley, "Who's Guarding the Guard and Reserve," *Armed Forces Journal International*, May 1986, p. 66.

⁴⁰Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 186.

⁴¹Sam C. Sarkesian, "Introduction," *Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military*, vol. 9, ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980), p. 11.

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⁴³*Ibid.*

CHAPTER III

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND THE NATIONAL GUARD

Introduction

Today, the word "organization" conjures up visions of large, granite monoliths, with walls of tinted glass, where men and women busily move about amid the hum of computers. Names like IBM, Texas Instruments, General Electric and Xerox have become household words. The success of corporations, to a considerable degree, is being attributed to their particular "culture." Indeed, much of the current popular literature today has focused on excellence in corporations as being the direct result of unique corporate cultures which emphasize participative management and caring for employees. The literature is, in fact, replete with stories of the importance of corporate culture to organizational success. Yet, to date, little, if any, attention has been given to the applicability of such notions of organizational culture to government organizations, and especially to the military establishment where billions of dollars are being appropriated. Is there such a thing as "culture" in a military combat unit? And, if so, what effect does it have on that unit's readiness? These are the questions that deserve answers if we are to ensure our defense dollars are being well spent.

What Is "Organizational Culture"?

"Culture" is an abstract term derived from anthropology which attempts to describe and explain man on the basis of the biological and cultural characteristics of the population wherein he abides. Essentially, it is concerned with the study of human differences.¹ An anthropological perspective of human behavior by Charles C. Case describes culture as follows:

In a very fundamental sense culture is the most human part of man's existence. It encompasses those aspects of being that are learned, those regularities that are acquired, those things that are gained through association with other humans. It is the social heritage that has developed out of the biological responses in the life process. It is the web of relationships holding people together in viable groups. It is the structure of predictability in the behavior of the members of society which tells each person who he is and who other people are. It provides the techniques for dealing with life problems, and for directing the shape of one's existence.²

Anthropologists use the term "culture" to describe the subject matter of their discipline. They distinguish *material culture* (material products, and artifacts), from what some refer to as *mental culture*, which are the social beliefs, values and norms.³

Beliefs, values, and related norms are an important part of culture; they help to explain the origin of artifacts and tools as well as the patterns of social behavior found in a given society. *Values and norms* are respectively criteria and rules of appropriate behavior, permeated with an affective (positive) quality that finds expression in artifacts and symbolism providing basic motivation for daily behavior.⁴

Specific definitions of culture literally abound. For example, social scientists A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn cite 164 definitions of culture in their review.⁵ Yet, although there are many differences in the multitude of definitions of culture, anthropologists agree on three characteristics:⁶

1. It is not innate, but *learned*;
2. Facets of culture are *interrelated*--attempts to intervene in any culture in one area will affect all other areas; and
3. It is *shared* and, in effect, defines the boundaries of different groups.

Organizational theorists and managers searching for better ways of studying organizations began to link organizational theory and culture together, and today we have the almost metaphysical concept of "organizational culture." Huse and Cummings define organizational culture as "... concerned with the beliefs and values shared by organizational members and represents the character of the organization as seen and experienced by its members."⁷

Another social scientist, Edgar H. Schein, goes one step further in defining organizational culture when he says that it is "... a pattern of basic assumptions--invented, discovered and developed by a given group as it learns to cope with the problems of external adaptation and internal integration. ..."⁸

These definitions emphasize the *group* as the basic element in organizational culture, and the beliefs, values and basic assumptions of its members. Inherent in this concept, however, is also the bonding, or "sharedness" of the culture among the group members and between leaders and followers that serves to perpetuate the culture. In fact, as Case says, "It is apparent that while culture is a product of human association, it functions to bind people together into the very groupness that sustains it."⁹

Today, the concept of organizational culture has taken center stage as a major concern in organization studies. It has become a widely acclaimed metaphor for understanding how organizations differ, how members develop bonding, or cohesion, and how members interact.¹⁰

How Does One Go About Identifying An Organization's Culture?

There are a number of different approaches one can take to deciphering an organization's culture. For example, there are quantitative methods that employ social psychology as a frame of reference which examine the climate of the organization. Survey research methodology spiced with statistical analysis are its tools. Then, there is another method, qualitative in nature, which emphasizes the ethnographic approach, or the participant observer. Here, face-to-face contact with members of the organization being studied, and direct participation in some of the group's activities is the prime focus. There is a greater emphasis on intensive work with others who are deeply involved in the organization and who can share insights and information, which is very important to acquiring a deeper understanding of the dynamics at play. The participant observer approach, coupled with documentary or survey data, is extremely useful in ascertaining the culture of the organization.¹¹ An example of this approach is W. Gibb Dyer, Jr.'s *Culture in Organizations: A Case Study and Analysis*. This particular study spanned a period of seven months at a large multibillion dollar industrial organization (all names have been disguised). The purpose of the study was to determine if key group assumptions concerning human nature, the relationships between members of the group, and finally, the relationship of the group to the environment could be applied to an organization.¹² The data for the study were gathered primarily from the organization's managers through formal interviews with key informant managers, informal interviews and conversations, observations, internal reports and documents, and external reports and documents.¹³

The purpose of gathering the data from a wide variety of sources was to elicit as much information as possible concerning the company's history, perspectives, values, language, codes of conduct, and other cultural artifacts, in order to discover, if possible, the assumptions that order these surface manifestations.¹⁴

The ethnographic approach is the mode of this inquiry into the organizational culture of the National Guard and its effects, if any, on unit readiness. The perspective here is that the group, or organization, has existed for some time, the result being a shared understanding of their particular world, which is largely taken for granted. Thus, because their understanding is shared, and largely assumed, a pattern develops whereby their language and activities take on meaning for the members that are relatively hidden from outsiders. Yet, these social understandings can be learned through intimate contact by participant observers who attempt to see the world of the group, or organization, through their eyes.¹⁵ What is actually entailed in this approach is the quest for understanding of the group's shared belief and value system that provide the impetus for underlying assumptions

which, in turn, influence the behavior of group members. Thus, key to understanding the culture of the organization is the identification of its critical components--values and beliefs, assumptions, and cohesiveness, bonding, or "sharedness."

Values and Beliefs

Values have been defined as "a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others";¹⁶ "those rules and codes of conduct that are seen as being instrumental in a number of problematic situations";¹⁷ "the deep seated, pervasive standards that influence almost every aspect of our lives: our moral judgements, our responses to others, our commitments to personal and organizational goals;"¹⁸ and "a sense of what 'ought' to be, as distinct from what is."¹⁹ Beliefs are "basic assumptions about the world and how it works."²⁰ And our most fundamental basic beliefs, many of which are the product of direct experience, are so taken for granted that:

We are apt not to notice that we hold them at all; we remain unaware of them until they are called to our attention or are brought into question by some bizarre circumstance in which they appear to be violated.²¹

Bem calls these beliefs Zero-Order beliefs and says that our faith in the validity of our sensory experience is the most important basic, or "primitive" belief of all.²² For example, we believe that an object continues to exist even when we are not looking at it.²³ Values include what an individual wants, desires, needs, enjoys, and prefers, through what he thinks is desirable, preferable, rewarding, and obligatory, to what the community enjoins, sanctions or enforces.²⁴ In fact, Bem says that beliefs, attitudes and values seem to be logically connected.²⁵

In the military establishment, rules and norms are established through the value system which permit the shaping and reinforcing of attitudes and behavior and, ultimately, readiness.²⁶ For example, core Soldier values in the Army have been described as those common to all good armies and soldiers such as skill, loyalty, stamina, discipline, professionalism, teamwork, and duty.²⁷ The strength of the military unit's culture then is directly proportional to the strength of these values among its members. This notion is reinforced by the fact that, to some social scientists, shared values of the group constitute the underpinnings of organizational culture.²⁸

In one study of organizational culture, evidence was provided indicating that strong culture companies had significantly higher levels of cohesiveness, management credibility, pride, satisfaction, identification, and willingness to work hard.²⁹ And, in a particular study by Posner, Kouzes and Schmidt, they discovered a strong positive correlation between the sharing of organizational values and important individual and organizational success measures.³⁰

Assumptions

For Schein, it is the basic implicit and unconscious assumptions of the group that are the real stuff of what culture is made.³¹ They give meaning to values, while guiding behavior of the individual and group. Our human need for order and consistency results in our assumptions becoming patterned into cultural "paradigms" which, in effect, tie together our basic assumptions about humankind, nature and activities.³² For Schein:

Unless we have searched for the pattern among the different underlying assumptions of a group and have attempted to identify the paradigm by which the members of a group perceive, think about, feel about, and judge situations and relationships, we cannot claim that we have described or understood the group's culture.³³

Cohesiveness

Finally, under the rubric of organizational culture is the implied "sharedness" which perpetuates the culture for generations to come. It is this bonding, or cohesion, which organization theorist Amatai Etzioni defines as "a positive expressive relationship among two or more actors"³⁴ that is of particular significance to the military. Various military authors claim that cohesion is an integral component of combat effectiveness.³⁵ For example, towards the end of World War II in Europe, the German military units retained their fighting spirit until the last few months of the war, even though they had been in almost constant retreat for two years. This fighting spirit was attributed to continued cohesion they experienced.³⁶ And, according to military writer Lewis Sorley, North Vietnamese forces prevailed even under almost insurmountable deficiencies because of their discipline and commitment, and ultimately cohesion.³⁷ Because cohesion is so important to organizational culture, particularly in the military, a better understanding of the role it plays in perpetuating the culture of the organization is in order.

The Nature of Group Cohesion

It is a fact that people, unless they are hermits, join groups. A person detached from group relationships is almost inconceivable.³⁸ Groups are conceded to be the basic units of society. Within groups there exists cohesion among its members, which is also called social solidarity by many sociologists.³⁹ The roots of cohesion seem to spread over a large array of factors, such as kinship, sharing a common language or religion, sharing the same land, interdependency, and the sharing of various experiences, both good and bad, pleasurable and painful. The cohesion that slowly develops through shared similarities, experiences and mutual interdependencies is the glue that binds the members of the group into a collective whole, such as a family, neighborhood, city, state and nation. The strength of the cohesiveness of a group, to a significant degree, determines the extent to which members of the group adhere to one another.⁴⁰

French sociologist Emile Durkheim noted two principal types of cohesion. One is based on similarities, such as sharing the same language, beliefs, and so forth. The other is based on differences and the resulting lack of self sufficiency experienced by the members which leads to interdependence.⁴¹ The point to be made is that in the latter type of cohesion not all differences make for cohesion. Some are actually divisive. The kinds of differences that contribute to cohesiveness are those that actually complement one another. For example, sex differences make male and female dependent upon one another. Thus, it is almost axiomatic that, when viewing cohesiveness in terms of shared similarities and interdependencies, the more bonds tying members together, the more cohesive the group will be. Among the important bonds that help tie members of the group to one another are similarity in religious beliefs, language, and mores; territorial proximity (how close they live to one another); common responsibility for the maintenance of order; common defense, mutual aid, and general living, experiencing, and acting together. The concept of cohesiveness has its roots in the study of group dynamics which attempts to understand why one group behaves differently than another. From a sociological perspective, the ability of a group to secure, through social controls, conformity of members to the norms of the group is a measure of that group's cohesion, the "glue" that cements the members to the group.⁴² To some analysts, cohesion is the "morale" of the group and "high morale" indicates the existence of strong cohesion.⁴³ Clausewitz called it the "military spirit" obtained from two sources that must interact with each other for it to be created:

The first is a series of victorious wars; the second, frequent exertions of the army to the utmost limits of its strength. Nothing else will show a soldier the full extent of his capacities.⁴⁴

This appears to be borne out in military sociologist Samuel A. Stouffer's descriptions of the American soldier during World War II.

The combat situation was one of mutual dependence. A man's life depended literally and immediately upon the actions of others; he in turn was responsible in his actions for the safety of others. This vital interdependence was closer and more crucial in combat than in the average run of human affairs. . . . But

even during battle, soldiers at the front felt strongly their mutual dependence, their common loneliness, their separate destiny apart from all who were not at the front. The significant experience they shared was a further bond between individual and group.⁴⁵

To military author and critic of the Army in Vietnam, Richard A. Gabriel, "Unit cohesion is not the result of weaponry or even the quality of troop training. It is the result of strong bonds of shared attachment among members. . . ."⁴⁶

One military definition of cohesion is "the bonding together of members of an organization/unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and the mission."⁴⁷ Since group cohesion does not always contribute to organizational/unit effectiveness, commitment to the unit and mission is an essential element of the definition.⁴⁸ This was articulated by Janowitz and Little in their study of U.S. Army units during World War II and the problems of "Negro" units:

Primary groups can be highly cohesive and yet impede the goals of military organizations. Cohesive primary groups contribute to organizational effectiveness only when the standards of behavior they enforce are articulated with the requirements of formal authority.⁴⁹

Studies of cohesion in the military usually focused on small unit level analysis, the squad, platoon and even the company. However, military writer William L. Hauser expands the concept of small unit cohesion to the level of "battalion" which is "the lowest ground force echelon with a commander, operational staff, personnel system, supply and maintenance infrastructure, and communications network."⁵⁰ He defines cohesiveness as:

. . . the ability of a military unit to hold together, to sustain mission effectiveness despite combat stress. That stress, which cannot be fully simulated in peacetime includes enemy violence, Clausewitz's "friction of war" (the concept that the simplest tasks become difficult under fire), fear of death and wounds, personnel turbulence, uncertainty, and the often poorly perceived connection between national purpose and military action, between resolve and soldier sacrifice.⁵¹

Summary

Organizational culture is essentially the product of the informal organization which evolves from the processes by which groups learn to deal with their external and internal environment. In essence, the informal organization is that group of constituents that spring up within the formal organization, developing their own practices, values, norms and social relationships as the members work together on a daily basis.⁵² The assumptions that develop in the group in its learning mode are then transmitted, passed on, if you will, to new members.⁵³ Key to the process of learning and transmission of outcomes is the role played by the leadership within the organization. The importance of leadership to organizational success is such that:

. . . insofar as the organization's effectiveness depends on effective value transmission, expressive leadership has to be provided or the organization will not be able to achieve its mission.⁵⁴

The concept of effective leadership being crucial to organizational effectiveness and culture is also shared by Schein who says that the founder of the corporation, or the leader, actually shapes the culture of the organization.⁵⁵ However, to Schein, it is the individual nature of the leadership role that is important. Others perceive leadership to be an organizational process whereby the various components of the system are in total harmony while they go about sharing the tasks. Leadership, within this frame of reference, is too important to be left solely to leaders, and is the responsibility of everyone who cares about what happens to their organization.⁵⁶

The following chapter discusses the implications of leadership on organizational culture, the Army National Guard, and unit readiness. Results of interviews with leaders and followers are provided as well as a description of Guard commanders, in terms of values, beliefs and perceptions of the Guard.

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CHAPTER IV

LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IN THE NATIONAL GUARD

Introduction

Karl von Clausewitz, in *On War*, said that "During an operation, decisions usually have to be made at once; there may be no time to review the situation or even think it through."¹ Indeed, in the military establishment there is little room for participative management particularly in a wartime scenario. However, during peacetime the leadership principles employed in industry and government can be very useful tools for the military commander for mobilizing support and commitment to his training objectives within the organization. In fact, the importance of effective leadership in the military was highlighted in a study of excellence in Army combat units during 1984. The authors of that study discovered that almost everyone they interviewed agreed that the single most important factor in creating the excellent battalion was the leadership of the battalion commander and that eventually the entire organization will reflect the commander's standards and personality.²

Commandship and Leadership

To command is to exercise authority, albeit the legitimate power that rests with the position itself. It is a singularly military act and embodies the employment of special skills and knowledge in decisionmaking that, in wartime, involves the responsibility for human lives. Implied in command is the concept of obedience to authority. As military writer Roger H. Nye explains:

To command is to direct with authority. To command a military organization is to think and make judgments, employing specialized knowledge and deciding what those commanded will and will not do. To command in wartime is to assume responsibility for taking and saving human lives. To command in peace and war is to direct how human beings will conduct themselves towards each other. As such, the commander sets moral standards and sees that they are obeyed. To command, therefore, is to think and decide, to feel and moralize, to act and wield power.³

The power inherent in the concept of command is, indeed, awesome and certainly does not exist in the civilian world of industry and bureaucracies. There, the position of authority is legitimated, to be sure, in the actual job description which labels the incumbent a supervisor or manager. And, although leadership skills are required, to a large degree, in order to influence subordinates' behavior, still, the power attendant to such authority pales in light of the ultimate power of command. However, even during combat, distinctions between commandship and leadership are, in reality, blurred by the simple fact that command by itself, will not cause men to risk their lives. As S. L. A. Marshall suggests, the ego is the most important of the motivational factors driving the soldier, and that if it were not for his ego, it would be impossible to make men face the risks of battle.⁴ From there, Marshall says that social pressure, more than military training, is the base of battle discipline, ". . . and that when social pressure is lifted, battle discipline disintegrates."⁵ The implications for leadership, then, becomes quite obvious.

Also, in a peacetime environment, organizational objectives for the military are mostly concerned with training for combat. Concomitant is the management of resources to accomplish these objectives. During wartime the commander is essentially an orchestrator of resources and a manager of violence. In contrast, during peacetime his leadership must take precedence over his commandship, simply because he does not have all the resources he needs at his disposal, and his mission is more vague. This does not imply he must be less a commander and more a leader. Rather, it serves to emphasize the unique role of the commander *as a leader*. As Nye says:

To command, then, is to manage well when management is called for, to lead well when leadership is necessary, and to carry out orders and enforce regulations when "going by the book" is all that is required. But to confuse each of these activities itself is to underestimate the need for taking intellectual and moral responsibility in the performance of one's military duties.⁶

The military leader today is confronted with challenges his predecessors in earlier periods never knew. Modern warfare has become one of high technology, rapidly changing situations, mobile and largely dispersed troops requiring intelligent, motivated, and, above all, innovative leadership down to the lowest level. Authority in small combat units, in particular, is no longer simply a matter of leader dominating the led, but also requires an ability to influence and motivate men, to inspire confidence and loyalty. This point is aptly made by the authors of *Crisis in Command*. This scathing and controversial indictment of the Army officer corps during the Vietnam War attributes the lack of cohesiveness of the troops to a decline in the quality of the officer corps.⁷

Throughout most of the interviews conducted during this study there seemed to be no doubt in anyone's mind that the key element in combat effectiveness was strong leadership, even above having sufficient state-of-the-art equipment. Most of those interviewed agreed that money and benefits are insufficient incentives by themselves for men to want to risk their lives defending their country. And, of all the Guard leaders interviewed, the consensus was that the quality of the Guard leadership, for the most part, was on par with, if not better than, the active establishment. This pride in one's organization was borne out in the written responses to the survey questionnaire as well. It was General John McAuley Palmer who said:

In civil life, as in the Army, it is the same general qualities that make the leader. Let the captains of industry receive the technical knowledge which he lacks in the art of warfare and he becomes easily a military commander.⁸

The National Guard Commander--A Profile

Through interviews with Guard leaders and followers and informal discussions with present and former members of the Guard, a profile of the Guard Commander emerged. Realizing the subjectivity of all concerned, the point to be made is not whether the profile is totally accurate, but rather that *they* perceive the Guard commander in this light. What evolves is a sense of duty, pride and professionalism coupled with a strong desire to serve the community and, at the same time, be accepted in the brotherhood of military professionals.

There are distinct and unique characteristics of Guard commanders that, according to many Guard leaders, set them apart from their active component counterparts, yet still contribute to their military professionalism. These factors include the time spent in command positions, time spent with combat troops throughout their career, real-life experiences as commanders of military units resulting from the Guard's dual role, and professionalism. To better understand the nature and role of the Guard commander from their perspective, and in the context of organizational culture, a quick review of each factor is necessary.

Command Time

The combat unit commander, described by most interviewees, has a formidable task set before him during peacetime. Infantry tactical training is not the stuff that makes for interesting and motivating training or career enhancement. For example, mine-laying is not a skill that can easily be transferred to the civilian world. Thus, motivation for training in combat units is a continuing enterprise. In the active Army unit, the commander of a battalion, for example, spends, on average, approximately two years in command, then moves on to another assignment, another organization, and, more than likely, another Army post. For the most part, the same holds true for commanders of companies as well. However, in the Army National Guard, the commander spends, on average, three to four years in command. The reason is that the Army National Guard commanders usually live in the community in which the unit is located. In effect, Guard members have less mobility than the active Army

commander simply because their civilian occupations are also located in the same community. Thus, rotation among command positions does not occur as frequently in the Guard as in the active component. Figuratively, the Guard "grows" its own commanders and leaders. From an organizational culture perspective, the shared experiences among the members, followers and leaders, throughout their long association together act as cohesion-builders for the unit membership. In fact, responses to the survey questionnaire pertaining to cohesiveness seem to indicate strong cohesion in Guard units both *between followers and leaders*, and *among the members themselves*.

Guard commanders, according to the interviews conducted, are also more autonomous than active component commanders, in many instances. For example, Guard units are located, in many cases, away from their parent battalion and the concomitant supervision of the battalion commander and his staff. Thus, they believe they have more latitude in managing their units than do their counterparts in the active Army, where the units are usually located on the same Army post and in walking distance from the parent headquarters. Also, Guard leaders claim, the Guard commander is more deeply involved in the overall management of the unit's affairs. Recruiting, as one example given, is part of the Guard commander's mission, as well as maintaining community relations, and even caring for the armory housing the unit in many instances. The armory, in many communities, is the hub of activity. Community sports events, crafts shows, town meetings and other such community activities are often conducted in the armories housing the local Guard unit. Many times these armories are also used as temporary shelters for victims of natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, and so forth. In effect, the community has a stake in the Guard unit and, to some degree, begins to rely on the unit and the armory.

As mentioned earlier, recruiting is one mission the Guard commander has that the active Army commander does not. Although recruiting for the Guard is primarily accomplished by a corps of full-time military recruiters working in the states, they are usually located at the State Headquarters under control of the Adjutant General's staff proponent for recruiting and retention. However, because personnel strength in the unit is one of the measurable variables presently used in the readiness reporting system, the unit commander is, according to many Guard leaders, under constant pressure from his superiors to recruit. To attest to this is the fact that the recruiting function is also included in the job description of the unit commander's full-time personnel who perform the administrative, supply, training and fiscal functions of the unit on a daily basis. Thus, the commander must not only concentrate energy on training the unit, but also must expend time and energy on alleviating personnel shortages which the active component commander does not become involved with due to the separate recruiting command of the Army.

From a cultural perspective, the Guard commander is in the enviable position of being able to influence the personnel composition of the unit. For example, through leadership ability, the effective company commander can build strong unit cohesion by influencing members to bring into the unit friends and relatives. In fact, this was found to be the case in a particularly cohesive unit visited during the study.

As mentioned earlier, the Guard commander spends approximately three to four years commanding, as opposed to an average two-year command for the active Army commander. But, just like the active Army commander, the Guard commander also trains the troops in classrooms, on ranges and in the field. The objective, according to the leaders interviewed, is to prepare the unit for combat and the emphasis is on realistic training with live-fire, whenever possible. The Guard commander usually lives and works in the same community as do the troops, as mentioned earlier. In many instances, the Guard commander, because he is a *Guardmember*, says he can identify with some of the problems the troops have such as attending all the training assemblies. In fact, many leaders interviewed pointed out that problems experienced by the troops are as much a problem for the commander, particularly in light of the stringent military educational requirements for promotion. Also, sacrificing valuable family time on weekends and weekday evenings seem to cause as much personal hardship for the commander as it does for the troops. Active component members were quick to point out that they, too, sacrifice many weekends in the performance of their duty. However, the Guardsmember quickly retorts that theirs is not a career in the sense of the active Army, but rather an additional obligation taken upon themselves, and thus their sacrifices are *self-imposed*. In fact, according to many Guard leaders and followers, the problems associated with attendance at training assemblies, pursuing a military education, participating in military exer-

cises, and other such activities which interfere with the pursuit of civilian occupations are universal problems among all Guard members and, as such, are accepted as necessary inconveniences. To these Guardsmembers, the very act of belonging to the Guard and the concomitant sacrifices inhere a sense of duty and obligation to serve one's community. In a cultural sense, the very act of coping with these problems is an integral component of the Guard's unique citizen-soldier culture which contributes to member cohesion. Of course, there are the economic incentives for Guard membership, but many Guardsmembers stated that if they were not receiving personal satisfaction from their Guard duty, even the money would not be worth the time spent away from their families and the interference with their civilian careers. The responses to the survey questionnaires concerning the degree of bonding, or cohesion, between the followers and leaders, and among members in the Guard is indeed quite strong. One possible reason for this is the visible shared sacrifices among Guard members.

Because Guard commanders are in command positions a longer period of time than the active Army commander, many say they are also in a better position to witness some of their plans and objectives come to fruition. Conversely, if the commander errs, the brunt will also be felt, more so than for the active component commander. This is essentially because the active commander usually departs the area at the end of the command, whereas the Guard commander usually remains in the same organization, albeit a different position, and in the same community. Thus, for the Guard commander there is no escaping the consequences stemming from mistakes made during command. For example, a commander who performs poorly during an important training exercise still remains in the organization to face peers, superiors and subordinates. A logical question at this point is: "Does three to four years' Guard command, which is done on a part-time basis, *really* measure up to the active Army commander's two years of full-time command?" The response that Guard leaders usually give is "no" *if you assume it is a part-time command*. According to many Guard leaders, personnel problems do not only occur on weekend training or during two weeks annual training. They, like the personnel within the organization, are there all the time. This is why the Guard commander has a full-time staff, a cadre, if you will, to assist in carrying out his command responsibilities on a daily basis, the same as the active component commander. For example, recruiting and retention problems, unauthorized absences (AWOLs), discharges, excused absences that require "make-up" training, mobilization record-keeping, and other various activities are ongoing actions that occur on a daily basis. Thus, although Guard commanders may not spend as much time with their troops as do active component commanders, the Guard commander believes they both share the same common problems associated with preparing a unit for combat including the maintenance of the unit's strength, discipline, equipment and training.

A battalion commander who had recently been promoted and assigned to the command said that he had at least three years remaining on his command to do something constructive in the organization. One objective he set for himself was the professional education of all noncommissioned officers within the command. He had his company commanders and battalion staff officers prepare a plan for each noncommissioned officer that would assist them in the attainment of their own objectives over the ensuing three years. He also personally ensured that the milestones included in the plan were realistic and attainable. And, he integrated their civilian education requirements into the plan as well. His presence within that organization over the next three to four years, he said, would provide the unique opportunity of overseeing and monitoring the results. To many Guard commanders, the active Army counterpart does not enjoy the same opportunity.

Troop Time

According to most Guard leaders and followers, the average Guard platoon leader generally knows the direction of his military career. For example, the first few years of commissioned service will be spent in front of a platoon, then maybe an assignment as Executive Officer of a company. If the officer excels, there may be a command of a company and promotion to captain. This is usually followed by an assignment on a battalion staff, and, if the officer continues to excel, a promotion will generally follow to major and an assignment to the Operations Officer position and then possibly to Executive Officer of the battalion. If the officer continues to perform better than his peers, there may be another command assignment, this time at battalion level, followed by a promotion to lieutenant colonel. Following this, it is usually back to a staff position, but at a higher headquarters

such as a brigade and, later, maybe even a command at that level. The point to be made is that the Guard leader, for the most part, does not leave the combat troop environment. In fact, according to most leaders in the Guard, the average officer spends all his career with combat troops. Unlike the active component commander, Guard leaders point out, there is no assignment to the Pentagon, or the Recruiting Command, or some American embassy in a foreign country. This holds true even if the Guard leader's civilian job requires relocation to another state. If the officer elects to remain in the Guard, there will usually be Guard units available in the new community. This is essentially because the Guard consists of approximately 3,600 units in 2,600 communities located in every state and territory of the nation.

In today's mobile society, it is not unusual for young executives to move about more readily than generations past.⁹ Since the National Guard, as mentioned earlier, draws its leaders from the community itself, most of the officers come from that mold. Although the community may lose this potential valuable resource of community service, the Guard, as a whole, does not simply because of the many opportunities available to the officer to continue serving as a citizen-soldier. Thus, collectively the Guard retains the expertise of its leaders. And, according to most Guard leaders interviewed, it is these cumulative training experiences over time that set the Guard commander and leader on an equal footing with the active component commander. Yet, as many Guard leaders are quick to mention, there is still one more aspect of the National Guard that provides both leaders and followers with the opportunity to significantly contribute to the welfare of the community and society, as a whole. This is the Guard's unique dual role--a state force under control of the governor during peacetime and a federal force subordinate to the active services during wartime.

Guard Commanders and Their Dual Role

In both the active component and the Guard, the emphasis is always on *training*, and to be sure, *realistic* training. However, one major difference between the Guard and the active Army is the fact that Guard units do not train as often as the active component, in terms of days consecutively spent performing combat-oriented training. However, as mentioned earlier, what the Guard commander loses in consecutive days spent in training, he makes up in the overall length of time spent performing military training and associated tasks over the span of his career in the Guard. In other words, it is this cumulative expertise that, as mentioned earlier, places the Guard commander on par with the active component commander. But, in the analysis of command there is still one more aspect of the Guard commander's training experiences that, according to most Guard leaders, is often overlooked. This is the Guard's participation in state missions resulting from natural disasters, civil disturbances and so forth.

Most Guard leaders agree that Guard commanders, to a large degree, can expect to command units that have been, or will be, mobilized for some form of state emergency during their career. In some parts of the country this is almost a common occurrence. Floods, forest fires, earthquakes, volcano eruptions, snowstorms, civil disturbances and other similar activities have the potential of affording the Guard commander with unique challenges and opportunities to exercise the troops, the unit's standard operating procedures, and the teamwork so vital in the execution of any mission. Although training within the active component is realistic, it is still *training*, say many of the Guard leaders and followers interviewed. On the other hand, the real-life experiences that inhere in many state emergencies provide the citizen-soldier with the opportunity to truly serve the community, and, from an organizational culture perspective, it is these experiences that help weave the fabric of unit cohesion for the membership. They provide the unit with a visible sense of purpose. As one Army National Guard leader said, "It gives us a chance to save lives rather than training to kill."¹⁰ These experiences sometimes involve life-threatening situations, which, for many Army National Guardsmembers, only add to the feeling of personal fulfillment that Guard members share. The underlying assumptions of the citizen-soldier at work in these situations are those that deal with a sense of duty, honor and commitment to one's community and country. This, too, was evidenced in the results of the survey questionnaire. Values such as loyalty, honor and commitment appear to be slightly stronger in the Guard sample. This could possibly be attributed to the fact that, like the Army, the Guard is also somewhat a reflection of the society, but because it is so closely tied to that society, the community itself, the values may be more strongly reflected. If this is the case, it would rein-

force the position of many proponents of increasing reliance on Guard and Reserves. Values undergird the culture of the organization and strong values that bond members to units can enhance effectiveness. Thus, the Guard and Reserves can, indeed, be an effective fighting force capable of taking their place along side the active component on the battlefield, and winning.

The Guard Commander and Professionalism

Can a reservist be a professional? Military sociologist Samuel P. Huntington says "no" because "... reservists seldom achieve the level of professional skill open to the career officers. . . ."¹¹ Huntington wrote this in 1956, and many changes in military standards and requirements for the Guard and Reserves have taken place since that time. Today, both in the active Army and the Guard, officers and noncommissioned officers must achieve certain military and professional education levels before they can advance through the ranks, much less be retained in the service. The Guard commander believes he is just as professional as is the active Army commander, and what is important to note, many Guard leaders believe their professional development represents greater sacrifices for them than for the active component commander. For example, the Guard leader must schedule his military and civilian education around his civilian occupation, which is his livelihood. In effect, he must be a professional in both areas--his civilian career *and* his military career. The active component commander only has one career to be concerned with, albeit a very important concern. However, the sacrifices that the Guardsmember makes do not only affect him personally, but his family as well. For a salesman in a large company, time spent away on training exercises or at a military school can be quite costly, both in terms of dollars lost in his civilian occupation, as well as possible damage to his civilian career potential. Of course the sacrifices the active Army leader makes is also felt by the family. Numerous reassignments require family relocations, children changing schools, and so forth. However, these are the sacrifices that usually accompany chosen careers. The Guardsmember who is employed at IBM would more than likely be subject to similar turbulence in his or her life. However, sacrifices associated with the Guard are not associated with livelihood and are "voluntary" in nature. This is important because, to most Guard leaders, it is these sacrifices that strengthen their commitment as citizen-soldiers to what military historian Jim Dan Hill calls their "avocation."¹² Roger H. Nye, citing Sam C. Sarkesian, says that the real test of professionalism is personal commitment to professional values, and "... this is proven when an officer voluntarily extends his active duty beyond the service obligation he undertook upon commissioning."¹³

The results of the analysis of core Soldier and American values between the active Army and Guard samples reinforce the notion that they are, indeed, important to the citizen-soldier avocation. As stated earlier, they seem to be stronger in the Guard which may also be attributed to the fact that the Guard member feels more committed to what he is doing because he is, in effect, a stakeholder.¹⁴ Mitroff defines these as interest groups, parties, actors, claimants, and institutions, both internal and external to an organization, that exert influence over it.¹⁵

Regardless of why members of the Guard enlist, the fact is that those who remain past their initial period of obligation do so because of many reasons, including economic. The point is that the longer they remain in the organization fulfilling the professional obligations that the role entails, the more committed they are to the organization and, thus, the more of a stakeholder they become. This may explain the positive attitudes concerning the Guard and its role in national defense that many senior leaders displayed during the interviews and discussions.

As stated earlier in this chapter, the importance of leadership to the nurturing and sustainment of the organization's culture is just as important to the military establishment as it is to civilian industry and government bureaucracy. The objective in this chapter was not to provide a discourse on leadership, per se. There is certainly more than sufficient literature on the subject of leadership for today's practicing manager and leader. From the potpourri of available models offered us, we have a choice of Situational Leadership, Contingency, Managerial Grid, just to name a few.¹⁶ Essentially, they focus, for the most part, on the notion that group performance can be enhanced by the use of an appropriate style of leadership. All one has to do is to develop a

repertoire, like a performer on stage, and one will soon be an effective leader. However, there is one type of leader that seems to transcend this "chameleon" who changes color with every situation. This is the leader that takes a proactive role in the organization and who is not afraid of change, but rather seeks it out and harnesses it as a positive form of energy within the organization.

The Transformational Leader

John MacGregor Burns describes this type of leadership as:

... an active relationship between the leader and the organization whereby the leader musters the organization's resources to accomplish his goals through the people of the organization.¹⁷

Bennis and Nanus call it "Transformative Leadership."¹⁸ As Noel Tichy and Mary Anne Devanna explain, "Transformational Leadership is about change, innovation and entrepreneurship."¹⁹ Essentially, it concerns management of change through aggressive, visionary leadership. The characteristics of transformational leaders, according to Tichy and Devanna, are:

1. They identify themselves as change agents.
2. They are courageous individuals.
3. They believe in people.
4. They are value-driven.
5. They are life-long learners.
6. They have the ability to deal with complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty.
7. They are visionaries.²⁰

With the increasing modernization of equipment in the Guard, coupled with a massive influx of information-processing technology, it is this type leader that is needed if the Guard is to continue to move forward to the year 2000. In fact, it was the transformational leader that was described most during interviews and discussions with leaders and followers in the Guard community, although not by name.

A Guard general officer said that leadership embodied integrity, moral and physical courage, competence, a genuine caring for subordinates, willingness to take necessary risks, and an eye for the future. A former brigade commander said he personally monitored each officer's professional development and ensured they all had the necessary resources available at their disposal. A First Sergeant related how he carries in his wallet the names and phone numbers of all his noncommissioned officers and calls them on a regular basis just to let them know he is interested in their professional development and problems. He personally helps them with their studies as well.

Another First Sergeant said he spends most of his time during weekend training assemblies making himself available to the troops answering questions and helping solve problems. Even as we spoke, another noncommissioned officer approached him and asked about obtaining an excused absence for one of his platoon members. The First Sergeant reached for his clipboard and removed a letter already signed by the unit commander and addressed to the soldier who had requested the absence. This First Sergeant was taking care of his troops.

A battalion commander said that his pet peeve was the notion that certain things in the unit should be left to noncommissioned officers, and that officers should not get involved in those areas. To this commander, leadership was every leader's responsibility. There was no such thing as "sergeants business." And, when we toured his battalion training area and viewed the training that was being conducted, it was obvious that he was practicing what he was preaching. Noncommissioned officers as well as officers were instructing, monitoring and supervising.

ing the training. And, in the command post, the Operations Officer was developing training plans that would take advantage of different training locales, integration of different and varied techniques of training, and the utilization of available simulator technology. In short, here was a proactive leader who knew and understood the importance of people to the attainment of his mission objectives and the positive effects that stimulating and interesting training can have on their motivation.

Summary

The leader is, indeed, a crucial component of the culture. In fact, because of the unique characteristics of the Guard and its dual role, leadership plays a very important role in the formation, maintenance and management of the organizational culture. As Schein says, "... the unique and essential function of leadership is the manipulation of culture."²¹ Thus, to Schein, leadership is intertwined with culture formation, evolution, transformation and destruction.²² Leaders create culture and when it becomes dysfunctional, leadership is needed to help the group unlearn some of its cultural assumptions and learn new assumptions.²³

For the Guard leader, who does not have visible contact with his/her unit on a daily basis, the creation and maintenance of a unique organizational culture can be a formidable task. Some units visited during the study were almost amorphous, in the sense of exhibiting a visible culture, while others displayed strong, viable cultures. The discriminating factor seemed to be the quality of leadership. The units with strong cultures had a large number of senior noncommissioned officers and mature commanders. These senior noncommissioned officers, or "old timers" are the transmitters of culture. They pass down to the newer members and younger soldiers the unit's history, lineage, myths, rituals, stories, and so forth. What this implies for the Guard is that strong organizational cultures can only evolve when senior leaders exist within an organization. Thus, the importance of retaining junior soldiers and leaders should become paramount in the Guard's long-range planning.

The effect of the organization's culture on the leader is also an important factor worth considering since the stronger the culture the more cohesive the organization, as was evidenced by this study. What is important to note is that units with strong cultures appeared to have strong leaders, even though the leader may have just assumed command or had been there for only a short period of time. It is almost as if the culture envelopes the leader and, in a sense, absorbs him/her unto itself. Conversely, a weak culture can have the opposite effect, that of distancing the commander from the unit and, unless he is a strong leader, with a corps of solid senior noncommissioned officers, the building of a new organizational culture may be near impossible. Thus, the importance of mature and effective leadership to the organizational culture of Guard units is almost axiomatic. The key element, of course, is the members of the organization--they must believe they do make a difference and that they are truly needed. They must feel like a part of the organization and have confidence in their leaders, and, according to my data, members in cohesive organizations do believe this.

Notes For Chapter IV

¹Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 102.

²Jerry A. Simonsen, Herbert L. Frandsen, and David A. Hoopengardner, *Excellence in the Combat Arms* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1984).

³Roger H. Nye, *The Challenge of Command* (New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1986), p. 19.

⁴S. L. A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire* (Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1978), p. 149.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶Nye, p. 29.

⁷Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, *Crisis in Command* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), p. 9.

⁸John McAuley Palmer, as quoted in Frederick Martin Stern, *The Citizen Army* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957), p. 258.

⁹Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William A. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton, *Habits of the Heart: Individuals and Commitment in American Life* (Berkeley: California Press, 1985), p. 197.

¹⁰Interview with former battalion commander.

¹¹Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 17.

¹²Jim Dan Hill, *A History of the National Guard* (Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1964), p. vii.

¹³Nye, p. 12, citing Sam C. Sarkesian, *The Professional Soldier in a Changing Society* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1975).

¹⁴Ian I. Mitroff, *Stakeholders of the Organizational Mind* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1983).

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁶Paul Hersey and Ken Blanchard, *Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 89-94.

¹⁷John MacGregor Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1978), p. 4.

¹⁸Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, *Leaders: The Strategies for Taking Charge* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1985), p. 3.

¹⁹Noel M. Tichy and Mary Anne Devanna, *The Transformational Leader* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1986).

²⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 271-280.

²¹Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985), p. 317.

²²*Ibid.*

²³*Ibid.*

CHAPTER V THE STUDY

Part 1--The Survey

Research Method

The approach used in this study of organizational culture and the National Guard is holistic in the sense that there is a reliance on the survey method, personal visits, formal interviews, informal discussions, a careful review of the literature on organizational culture, and my own interpretations drawn from over twenty years of full-time duty in Guard units from company through battalion, brigade and up to division level. There is also a period of eight years as a staff officer at the national level as well. Thus, there are the subjective experiences gained from duty with the troops in the field, and the objectivity provided by eight years away from troop duty at the national level. This combination assisted in the development of a balanced approach. These experiences, from an ethnographic perspective, allowed me to become part of the situation being studied and, at the same time, aided my understanding of the members within the situation in an empathic sense. As Sanday says, "Participant observation demands complete commitment to the task of understanding."¹

This is an ethnographic approach emphasizing participant-observer technique, which is the method of inquiry that relies, to some degree, on a subjective view of the situation being studied. As such, it can be a very useful tool, particularly when supplemented by a variety of data collection tools such as key-informant interviewing, structured interviews and questionnaire administration.² Although there is a place in the social sciences for objectivity, this does not mean that the subjective view should be excluded.³ According to the authors of *Inside the Bureaucracy: The View From the Assistant Secretary's Desk*, which is an analysis of assistant secretaries' roles, relationships, and career patterns, as described by themselves:

Too many models and conceptual frameworks in political science, public administration, and the management sciences have almost entirely ignored the individual personality, seeing it at best as an instrument, voice, or symbol.⁴

In that study, the authors:

... tried to see from the assistant secretaries' point of view the complex interplay between career bureaucrats and political appointees, between external and internal constituencies, between the departmental assistant secretary and the special assistants in the White House, and among the agencies and institutions.⁵

This is, in essence, the method employed in the present study. Through the use of questionnaires, data is obtained as concerns values and cohesiveness. From the visits to Guard units, formal and informal interviews with leaders and followers in the Guard environment, and the informal discussions with other knowledgeable individuals, a clearer understanding of the Guard and its culture unfolded, as seen through the eyes of the members.

Objective

My goal is simple and rests on the premise that every organization has a culture⁶ and that "values are the bedrock of any corporate culture."⁷ In addition, organizational culture can, indeed, not only be created and managed, but also if left alone, it can die. It is "that something" that members talk about, yet cannot define; they can feel it, yet they cannot touch it. An experienced leader senses it as soon as he enters the organization, and also senses its loss when departing. In a military sense, it is the organization's "center of gravity," which, according to Clausewitz, is the "... hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends."⁸ In an organiza-

tion, this "center of gravity" is the people--their values, shared understandings and unconscious assumptions that drive their attitudes, shaping their behavior and actions. Thus, organization strategists like military strategists need to be cognizant of their organization's culture so that they may manage it successfully, or change it, if necessary.

*"Is There A Distinct Guard Culture?
Does Organizational Culture Affect
Unit Readiness?"*

These are the questions that are at the very core of this study. To answer the first question, the survey technique is employed in which American and Soldier values, as defined by the Department of the Army, and the cohesiveness of an Army National Guard sample are compared with the values and cohesiveness of an active Army sample. This comparative/descriptive study has, as its foundation, the premise that values are an integral component of organizational culture and cohesion. In a broad sense, it reflects the willingness of members of a group or organization to conform to the standard, or norm, of the group, which implies commitment to the group itself.⁹

Background of the Survey

During 1986, the Army conducted a survey of approximately six thousand members, including Army civilian employees, to ascertain the personal importance of core American values and core Soldier values. The Army described core American values as those reflected in the Constitution, such as freedom, liberty, justice and equality. The core Soldier values were described as those common to all good armies, such as skill, loyalty, stamina, discipline, professionalism, teamwork and duty.¹⁰ The survey instrument developed by the Army Research Institute had been weighted and factored. It was this questionnaire, tailored to the Army National Guard, that was used in the present study. Modifications to the original survey instrument were minor and did not affect the factoring or weighting of the instrument. Data entry and tabulation results were computer-assisted using the Statistical Analysis System (SAS). All data were entered in the data base, regardless of whether all items on the questionnaire were completed. Lack of response was entered as a missing response. Percentages are used to summarize the mean data from the survey analysis. The sample is large, over seven hundred members, and when the base is large the percentage is reasonably reliable.¹¹

Conduct of the Guard Survey

1. One thousand randomly-selected Guard members from the South and West were mailed the questionnaires with an accompanying letter asking their help in the survey. The reason for this was that member addresses are maintained by the Guard headquarters in each state. To request each state to provide me with a sample would have placed an unnecessary burden on those involved in training exercises and other more important missions. Thus, specific states from various parts of the nation were solicited and they provided names and addresses from a random selection of Guard members across their state. These members were mailed the questionnaire and, in addition, were asked to return the completed survey in the envelopes provided as soon as possible. A period of two months was allotted for receipt, completion and return of the questionnaire by recipients before any analysis was initiated. Of the 1,000 questionnaires mailed, 297, or 34 percent, were returned properly completed within the two-month time-frame. Questionnaires sent through the mail often have a very low response rate.¹² In fact, having more than 60 percent of the questionnaires returned without a lot of follow-up is unusual.¹³ Realizing that a distortion caused by nonreturned questionnaires is always possible, the sample was expanded, so that it would be more representative of the whole Guard population. This was accomplished as indicated below.

2. Two Army National Guard infantry battalions located in the northeast section of the country were included in the survey. These two battalions were selected because of the dual role they were to play in the overall research design. First, their responses to the questionnaires would be included with the responses from the direct mailing group and, together, would constitute the Guard portion of the active Army-Guard comparison. This

would assist in answering the first question: "Is there a distinct Guard culture?" The responses to the questionnaires, however, would also be augmented by interviews, which will be discussed later.

The second role of these two battalions in the overall research design was to aid in answering the second question: "Does organizational culture affect unit readiness?"

The rationale for selection of these two battalions was based on the fact that one had a higher training readiness rating than the other over a period of at least five years. Both battalions, however, were similar in other areas such as personnel strength, equipment readiness and equipment on hand. Thus, a comparison of both battalions' values and cohesiveness would assist in identifying the affect, if any, that organizational culture had on training readiness. These responses, too, would be augmented by interviews of members of both organizations, which will be covered later.

Training readiness ratings, as developed by the Army today, do not necessarily reflect the unit's true readiness posture, as indicated in an earlier chapter. But, because there is presently no other methodology available that can objectively *qualify* readiness, the present measurement criteria used by the Army was used in this analysis, which was, as mentioned above, augmented by personal visits, observations and interviews.

For obvious reasons, the battalions selected for this study are designated Battalion A (lower training readiness rating) and Battalion B (higher training readiness rating). The five companies of Battalion A are co-located in one large armory in a major urban area. At the time of the survey, the battalion had a total assigned strength of 547, of which 36 percent participated in the survey ($N = 198$).

Battalion B's companies were split over five locations encompassing both an urban and rural area within a fifty-mile radius. At the time of the survey, it had an assigned strength of 584, of which 42 percent participated ($N = 266$).

Both battalions had similar equipment. There was a higher minority representation in Battalion A than in Battalion B. For example, in Battalion A, 15 percent of the respondents described themselves as white (non-Hispanic); 21 percent said they were Black, and 64 percent reported themselves as being Hispanic and other minorities.

In Battalion B, 65 percent said they were white (non-Hispanic); 11 percent were Black, and 24 percent reported themselves as Hispanic and other minorities.

In terms of military grades of battalion members, in Battalion A, 52 percent were E-4 and below (these are usually the Followers); 40 percent were E-5 through E-9 (Non-Commissioned Officers [NCOs]), and 8 percent were Officers. (Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers are usually the Leaders.) (See Table 2.)

In Battalion B, 53 percent were E-4 and below; 42 percent were E-5 through E-9 (NCOs), and 5 percent were Officers. (See Table 2.)

Description of the Total Guard and Active Army Sample

The total Army National Guard sample, which includes the two infantry battalions and the direct mailing group, consisted of 728 respondents ($N = 728$). Of this sample, 47 percent were White (non-Hispanic); 15 percent were Black, and 38 percent were Hispanic and other minorities. The military grades were: E-4 and below, 46 percent; E-5 through E-9 (NCOs), 43 percent; and Officers, 11 percent. (See Table 3.) Of the 188 Leaders and Followers of the active Army sample, 63 percent were White (non-Hispanic); 20 percent were Black, and 17 percent were Hispanic and other minorities. The military grades were: E-4 and below, 64 percent; E-5 through E-9 (NCOs), 27 percent; and Officers, 9 percent. (See Table 3.)

TABLE 2
SURVEY RESPONDENTS BY GRADE AND ETHNIC MAKE-UP OF TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS

	GRADE			ETHNIC		
	E4 and Below	E5-E9 (NCO)	Officer	White	Black	Hispanic and Others
Battalion A (N = 198) (Lower Training Readiness Rating)	52%	40%	8%	15%	21%	64%
Battalion B (N = 266) (Higher Training Readiness Rating)	53%	42%	5%	65%	11%	24%

TABLE 3
**SURVEY RESPONDENTS BY GRADE AND ETHNIC MAKE-UP IN TOTAL GUARD AND
ACTIVE ARMY SAMPLE**

	GRADE			ETHNIC		
	E4 and Below	E5-E9 (NCO)	Officer	White	Black	Hispanic and Others
Battalion A (N = 198) (Lower Training Readiness Rating)	52%	40%	8%	15%	21%	64%
Battalion B (N = 266) (Higher Training Readiness Rating)	53%	42%	5%	65%	11%	24%
Army National Guard (N = 728)	46%	43%	11%	47%	15%	38%
Active Army (N = 1,988)	64%	27%	9%	63%	20%	17%

The wide disparity in the number of minorities between the active Army sample and the Army National Guard sample could be attributed to the geographical location of the Guard battalions included in the survey. Battalion A was located in an area where the Guard was well-represented by minorities, which also reflects the particular demographics of the area itself. However, the disparity could very well also be attributed to a bias that may have crept into the study. For example, all of the members in both battalions did not complete the questionnaire. It is possible that only those actually present at the time the questionnaire was being administered participated. By this is meant that members could have been present for training but performing duty at a location different from where the questionnaire was being administered. This may also hold true for the Vertical Bonding, or cohesive scale, questions 110, 111 and 112 together form a scale measuring the social and personal support provided by the immediate leader. Questions 113, 114 and 115 together form a scale measuring the quality of the immediate leader's task performance. the active Army sample as well and may also explain the large difference in the number of NCOs and officers in both samples.

Although personal visits to both Guard battalions surveyed were conducted by the researcher and the sample found to be representative, the size of the sample decreased the extent to which generalizations can be made to

the Guard as a whole. Additionally, the survey instruments had built-in restrictions inherent in such surveys in that the assumption was made that all participants could read and understand the terminology or that the instruments were administered with little environmental disruption. These delimitations were offset, to some degree, by the interviews and discussions conducted over the length of the study.

How They Responded

Specific responses to questions concerning core American and Soldier values and cohesion (bonding) can be found in Appendices A through I. On the whole, it appears that the values espoused by the Guard members are slightly stronger than those espoused by the active Army member. This may not be unusual since the roots of the citizen-soldier, as discussed earlier, reach down through the family and into the community, which has been the undergirding strength of the militia concept since its very inception. It is interesting to note that more than 50 percent of the Guard sample saw *each* of the eight Core Soldiers Values as being very or extremely important, compared to the active Army sample where only six of these values were reported as being very or extremely important by more than 50 percent of the respondents. The two Core Soldier Values that did not muster more than 50 percent of the active Army support in terms of being very or extremely important were: loyalty to your unit or organization (49.8%), and putting what is good for your fellow soldiers, unit and the nation before your own welfare (47.90%). The Guard responses for these two values were 75.92 percent and 57.29 percent, respectively. This may imply that the citizen-soldier ties to the unit and community are, indeed, a significant part of the Guard culture.

In an analysis of cohesion, or bonding, *between* Followers and Leaders (Vertical Bonding) and *among* Followers (Horizontal Bonding), it appears that the degree of cohesion on the Horizontal scale seems to be stronger in the active component than the Guard but, on the Vertical scale, the difference seems to be less significant. (See Table 4.) For the Horizontal Bonding, or cohesive scale, questions 92, 93 and 94 together form a scale measuring interpersonal closeness. Questions 95, 96, 97, 98, 99 and 100 together form a scale measuring the quality of unit members' job performance behavior within the group.

The results imply that cohesion *among* soldiers in the Guard is almost as strong as cohesion reported in the active component, but there is less difference in the reported cohesion between soldiers and their leaders of both the active Army and the Guard sample. The possibility that cohesion among soldiers may be stronger in the active Army than in the Guard can probably be explained by the fact that members of the active component spend more time together than do the Guard members. As for the similarity in the Vertical scale, where Guard soldiers seem to feel as close to their leaders as do the active component soldiers, the implication may be that Guard leaders do, in fact, obtain the respect and confidence of the soldiers of the unit on par with the active component leader. Thus, on the surface, a comparison of values, both Core American and Core Soldier, between members of both components seem to point to one single over-arching military culture existing in both the active Army and the Guard.

The *overall* results of the survey comparison between the Guard and the active Army, however, seem to imply that the Guard's culture is somewhat *different* from that of the active Army. This conclusion primarily emerged from personal visits, interviews and discussions which revealed a difference among organizations themselves in terms of shared understanding, values, cohesiveness and leadership, which implies that subcultures may exist within the Guard itself. The distinction between an organization's dominant culture and the various subcultures that might coexist with it are explained by Joanne Martin and Caren Siehl in "Organizational Culture and Counterculture: An Uneasy Symbiosis." These authors claim that "A dominant culture expresses, through artifacts, core values that are shared by a majority of the organization's members."¹⁴ They list three types of subcultures as being conceivable: enhancing, orthogonal, and counter-cultural.¹⁵

An enhancing subculture would exist in an organizational enclave in which adherence to the core values of the dominant culture would be more fervent than in the rest of the organization. In an orthogonal subculture, the members would simultaneously accept the core values of the dominant culture and a separate, unconflicting set of values particular to themselves.¹⁶

TABLE 4
HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL BONDING MEASURES FOR ACTIVE
ARMY AND NATIONAL GUARD SAMPLES

HORIZONTAL BONDING	
(A measure of Interpersonal Closeness, as reported by Followers)	
Active Army	71.31%
Army National Guard	66.48%
(A measure of Quality of Unit Members' Job Performance Behavior within the Group as reported by Followers)	
Active Army	68.57%
Army National Guard	67.52%
VERTICAL BONDING	
(A measure of Social and Personal Support provided by Immediate Leader as reported by Followers)	
Active Army	72.23%
Army National Guard	68.46%
(A measure of Quality of the Immediate Leader's task performance as reported by Followers)	
Active Army	69.47%
Army National Guard	67.06%

The counterculture is self-explanatory. The National Guard, it appears, would fall under the purview of the orthogonal model. The active Army military cultural values are overlaid on the Guard as a whole, but the Guard also has its own particular set of values that complement the culture of the active establishment while recognizing its own distinct citizen-soldier subculture.

Thus, the first question, "Is there a distinct Guard culture?" seems to be answered. From interviews and discussions, coupled with the responses from the survey questionnaires, an image emerges of a distinct and unique "quasi-military" Army National Guard culture which has, as its core, the values of serving and obligation to one's community--the "Minuteman," or as it is better known today, the "Citizen-Soldier." The values of patriotism, loyalty to the nation, the military unit and all the other concomitant American and Soldier values surveyed in this study do exist in both the Guard and the active component. However, what differentiates the Guard from the active Army is a strong desire, a "felt" obligation on the part of the member to serve the community, *as well as defend the nation*. From interviews and discussions, this does not appear to be motivationally driven by economics, in terms of the salary and benefits received, although these may be incentives for joining the Guard. Even the retirement pension of the Guardmember, which is quite small, cannot be received until after the member reaches 60 years of age, and only after completing twenty years of service. The citizen-soldier, it seems, belongs to the Guard and maintains the inherent professional standards, while making the necessary sacrifices, simply because of the desire to make a contribution to one's community, to serve while providing for the family through the pursuit of personal occupational goals. Essentially, the citizen soldier seeks to serve *first*, and if called upon, to *defend*. Also, from the visits, observations, discussions and interviews, a more humanistic perspective of the citizen-soldier's role also emerged in the sense of a strong desire to serve one's neighbors and community--not simply a "job," but rather a "calling."

Not all men and women desire to be warriors all the time, nor do they wish a career in an active military component. Personal ambitions and civilian careers are also very important components of life. Yet, the community, in order to survive, must have the wherewithal to do so, and this requires people who are trained to defend the community when called upon to do so, equipped properly and, in effect, ably prepared. To be able to pursue one's personal ambitions and occupational objectives while at the same time ready to take up arms and defend one's way of life and the community's welfare has been the underlying principle of the militia concept throughout history.

A Comparison/Description of Two Infantry Battalions

It appears that most of the soldiers in both battalions like each other (95%). Only 16 percent said they did not trust the other soldiers in the unit. In terms of their perceptions of their leaders, most soldiers said their leaders were doing a very good job (Battalion A, 86%; Battalion B, 82%). About the same number in each battalion said their immediate leader understood them (Battalion A, 64%; Battalion B, 63%). And, most soldiers said their leader is there most of the time to listen to them (Battalion A, 71%; Battalion B, 70%).

One major difference between both battalions seems to be the reported cohesiveness. Battalion A, the one with the lower training readiness rating, seems to have a *higher* degree of cohesion than does Battalion B. Granted, this may be attributed to factors such as the over-rater or under-rater bias in survey methodology which is the tendency for some respondents to give consistently high or low ratings.¹⁷ Because this was so perplexing, it was made a matter of special interest during visits to both organizations.

Essentially, during the analysis of the two infantry battalions, it was discovered that Battalion B, with the higher training readiness rating, did not fare as well as Battalion A in the values and bonding responses. But, when the hard data is examined, such as attendance, Battalion A's attendance over the year had been significantly lower than Battalion B (Battalion A's average attendance, 62%; Battalion B, 88%). Thus, the battalion with the *higher* training readiness rating did, indeed, have a *higher* rate of attendance which implies high morale and lends credence to the way the Army measures readiness of units. But, how do we then explain why Battalion A, with a *lower* training readiness rating, appears to have *stronger* core Soldier and American values and cohesiveness than Battalion B, but *lower* average attendance over the year. The initial reaction would be to examine the leadership styles within and between the organizations' leaders. Thus, it was necessary, if answers to these questions were to be obtained, to visit the battalions, observe and interview members.

In terms of leadership, both battalion commanders' styles were similar. Each was participative, to a degree. However, one difference observed was that Battalion B commander had more experience and was more technically qualified. In Boyatz's terms, he used "Expert Power"¹⁸ which appeared very effective. However, the results of my visits and interviews provided a different explanation for the puzzle described above. It was learned that training was being seriously disrupted in Battalion A because of the Governor's policy of housing homeless people within the battalion's armory. The battalion, in fact, was denied use of its own classrooms, locker rooms and many other rooms in the armory formerly used by the membership as social areas. This caused the battalion to resort to more outdoor training in inclement weather which was reported by the leadership as being a major contributor to the poor attendance of the battalion. Conversely, other soldiers reported that they stayed away from the armory because they did not like the stench of the building and having to mingle with people, many of whom they described as derelicts. This is extremely important when one considers the fact that this armory was a well-kept building constructed during the 1920s, that housed one of the most prominent Guard organizations in military history. Pride in one's organization stems from the past as well as the present. Lineage, traditions and history, which are carefully nurtured and passed down to succeeding generations, contribute significantly to the culture of the organization. Memorabilia of the organization, which are a component of Schein's artifacts of the organization's culture, are very important to the membership. When they perceive that outsiders are allowed to come into their world and abuse it, the fabric of the organization's sense of identity begins to unravel.

Summary

This comparison/description of the two infantry battalions seem to point to one conclusion: There is no direct correlation between the way the Army measures *unit readiness* and the actual *performance of the unit as a whole*. The readiness reporting system in use today measures quantifiable indicators of a unit's status and, as such, may be very useful in predicting to some degree the unit's military capability. However, to extrapolate from the hard data included in the methodology used to measure readiness to purport that a unit is, indeed, ready for *combat* ignores the immeasurable variables such as *esprit de corps*, cohesiveness, in short, the organization's culture. The implication is that these variables need to be included in the assessment of military capability and combat effectiveness. The effect could be a clearer picture of unit readiness and the unit's capability to fight and win on the battlefield.

Realizing that surveys alone were insufficient in such an analysis, interviews were conducted to further understand from the experts themselves the value system and basic underlying assumptions of the second and third levels of culture as described by Schein.¹⁹

Part 2--The Interviews

Introduction

Generally, the interviews were open-ended and unstructured, in the sense that they were patterned after the client-centered counseling technique of Carl Rogers, which gives the respondent broad freedom to express himself in his own way and in his own time.²⁰ The interviewees consisted of a total of thirty-three national-level policy makers, both military and civilian; policy makers at the state level, including Adjutants General and many of their staff; down the military chain of command to the units that were surveyed. Also included were individuals outside the Department of Defense that had considerable knowledge and experience in Army and National Guard matters.

At the national level, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Army and Air Force Secretariats, the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau were included. Additionally, a few organizations outside the military establishment which had knowledge of Guard activities such as the General Accounting Office and the National Guard Association were included.

The formal interviews averaged approximately 45 minutes to an hour. The many informal discussions beyond the 33 interviews conducted were shorter. One question asked of all interviewees was: "What are some of the things that go into making a unit ready for combat." Responses varied. The replies most often given to describe indicators of a unit's combat preparedness were high attendance at training assemblies and annual training, high retention (or low personnel turnover), a successful recruiting program, sufficient modern equipment, and realistic training. At the national level, most interviewees began their list of indicators with the *statistics* normally associated with the Unit Status Report, such as unit strength, personnel qualifications, and so forth. However, at the lower level, division down through battalion, the emphasis was on morale, *esprit de corps*, discipline, in short, the immeasurable variables. But, there was one common denominator that surfaced over and over again, from the national level down to the company--the importance of strong, effective leadership to the unit's readiness.

The rationale for querying both Leaders and Followers at all levels as to what they considered important to unit readiness was to determine congruency between the leaders' responses and those of the followers. If there is more to being ready than what the Unit Status Report indicates, then it is equally important to ensure that everyone understands what additional criteria should be considered and how variables that do not lend themselves to easy measurement, such as leadership affect and cohesiveness, can be included in readiness determination. In short, the impact of leadership on organizational culture and its subsequent affect on readiness needs to be addressed.

By talking to members of the units surveyed *after* the questionnaire had been completed and returned, the researcher was better able to ask the right questions and draw better conclusions while observing actual behavior. One way in which their values, norms, beliefs and unconscious assumptions began to surface was when both Leaders and

By talking to members of the units surveyed *after* the questionnaire had been completed and returned, the researcher was better able to ask the right questions and draw better conclusions while observing actual behavior. One way in which their values, norms, beliefs and unconscious assumptions began to surface was when both Leaders and Followers described their unit's readiness through stories of personal experiences, which seemed to provide an added dimension to their membership in the unit. Pettigrew suggests that organizational culture is manifested through such aspects as symbols, ideologies, languages, beliefs, rituals and myths or stories.²¹ And Alan L. Wilkins claims that stories may function to communicate presuppositions or values within organizations.²²

Most of the stories related during the interviews and discussions had a certain shared quality about them which often centered on contributions made by the individual and the unit to the community. Seldom were there stories relating to actual training experiences, although a few stories told of live-firing exercises conducted at night, or during inclement weather. These types of training experiences, according to many, offered unique challenges. Overall, the common thread that seemed to run throughout all the stories was the citizen-soldier donning his military uniform and performing his role as a soldier in a professional manner, while at the same time making a contribution to his community. Among the many stories related, the following are but a representative sample that should provide a vivid description of the Guard's role and its culture.

Assistance To The Community

Aid to the community has always been a traditional part of the Guard heritage. During 1986, for example, 9,053 Guard members were called to duty during 465 state emergencies that ranged from medical evacuations to fighting forest fires.²³ This amount of activity is not unusual, however. In many regions of the country, the Guard is relied upon extensively for such assistance. It is these shared unique experiences which are the stuff of the organizational culture. The opportunity to be of useful service to one's community in time of need and the experiences derived from actually employing and utilizing one's military skills, including the exercising of teamwork, strengthens the ties that bind, the cohesiveness, as well as the skills within the organization. These experiences are passed to unit members in the shape of stories, that, over time, became almost legends, and like threads through a fabric, they create a distinct unit character. Unlike the active Army, where there are no such activities, the Guard's role in community assistance cements its ties to the community, as well as the nation as a whole. A former battalion commander related one such story.

A blizzard had hit the region and everything had come to a crunching standstill. Roads were blocked, electrical power was lost to many homes, and people were stranded. Transportation was almost nonexistent. The mayor of the city asked the Governor's office for assistance. The Governor responded by calling out the Guard and the local Engineer battalion was mobilized. Through the use of telephone and radio announcements, unit members were told to report to their armory, and they did--on skis, snowmobiles, and even snowshoes. The battalion commander sent trucks to key pick-up points around the area and within four hours, 75 percent of the troops were in formation and ready to move. Within six hours, the battalion's heavy engineer equipment was plowing, towing, sanding and salting. Before the night was over, the battalion had succeeded in freeing up major transportation arteries, as well as assisting law enforcement authorities in rescuing stranded motorists. As the officer was relating this story, it was obvious by the pride in his voice that his battalion had performed well. It was, indeed, capable of accomplishing its mission--the mission for which it was organized. There was no doubt in this Leader's mind that his battalion was ready for combat.

An Operations Sergeant from a Guard organization located in a large metropolitan area told a story that involved the feeding by members of his organization of a large number of retarded children during an outing sponsored by a community-based volunteer organization. The Guard personnel, all volunteers, were comprised mostly of cooks who took time off their civilian jobs to offer their services. Whenever military equipment is requested for use in the community, it is common practice to attempt to have military personnel operate the equipment. However, such duty, if not of an emergency nature, is usually done on a volunteer basis, sometimes without any extra pay. There were numerous logistical problems associated with this particular venture, but, according to the Operations Sergeant, everyone worked together to iron out all the difficulties until the last child was fed,

trucks were loaded, and the equipment was cleaned and returned to the armory supply rooms. The cooks not only performed duties directly related to their military skills, thereby enhancing their own individual proficiency, they were also able to make a significant contribution to their community.

The National Guard has also participated in civil disturbances, operations concerned with police and firemen's strikes and walkouts by state prison employees. Under these conditions, the Guard is called to state duty to maintain safety, law and order.

A former battalion commander told one story about his battalion which had been mobilized to assist law enforcement agencies when state prison guards walked off the job. Within hours of the order to mobilize, his troops were "standing tall" by their vehicles ready to move 50 miles to take their positions outside the giant walls of the prison. By nightfall, tents were up, mess operations underway, and troops were performing guard functions beside civil law enforcement personnel. The immense pride and feeling of accomplishment that his troops experienced went a long way toward heightening their morale. And, weeks later, while still performing their mission, their spirit had not weakened. According to this commander, it was this unique experience that brought the members of the organization closer together.

Training

Another aspect of the various stories related regaled the professionalism of unit members. For example, a Guard officer described his unit's success by the way it conducted road marches to and from training sites. He proudly described the outstanding appearance of the vehicles and the troops. One particularly long and arduous road march stood out above the rest, he said, because the convoy, after being on the road for five days, arrived at its destination without any mishap or maintenance problems. This commendable achievement reflected the high state of maintenance of the vehicles as well as the keen safety awareness on the part of the troops. Words like "team effort" and "helping one another" were interspersed throughout the story.

Others told of their unit's particularly high morale, or low personnel turnover. And, still others told of grueling inspections conducted by higher headquarters where the unit had excelled. Many prior service members, those who had service in the active Army before joining the Guard, often said that their present unit had performed better than their former active Army unit. Whether this was true or not is not the issue. What is important is the pride of belonging, the shared quality of their experiences, that made their unit something special. The commonality of all these stories, however, lies in the shared value system that, sometimes, seems to be taken for granted, as a matter of course. The Guard members were working together as professional soldiers and concerned citizens; the citizen-soldier, whose Guard experiences helped bond them together, and to their unit. As Noel M. Tichy says, "As social tools, organizations are held together, in part, by a normative glue--that is, by the sharing of certain beliefs by its members."²⁴

In the active Army, members spend, on average, about two years in a unit and then are reassigned. Thus, there may be a feeling of belonging to the Army, as a whole, but in the Guard, where members serve most of their careers in one unit, or in many instances, one battalion, in the same community, the bonding may be stronger because of the long-standing shared beliefs and values of its members. These taken-for-granted assumptions are significant in that they guide the behavior of the individual. For example, in the stories related above, the unconscious assumptions of the group dealt with their role as "professional" soldiers and concerned citizens--the citizen-soldier. It was their "duty" to volunteer their services to the community because that is what militiamen for over 200 years have done. There are, however, instances when unconscious assumptions are not always positive. In fact, they can also be negative which sometimes, when awakened from dormancy, can do considerable harm to the culture of the organization. A battalion commander told me of one such incident.

During a major reorganization in his state, a number of infantry battalions were being redesignated and some were even being eliminated from the force structure. The plan called for the transfer of members from the battalions being eliminated to the battalions remaining in the system. The criterion for such assignments was the commuting distance of the members from their home to their new unit of assignment. What the plan failed to ac-

knowledge was that these battalions shared a long history, rich with traditions. Many of the members were non-commissioned officers who had served their entire careers in those organizations, as did some of their relatives and friends. To simply publish an order transferring members without first surveying them to solicit their preferences sent signals to those members that essentially told them they were expendable. And, what was worse, the plan called for elimination of these battalions without so much as observing proper "burial rites" such as the formal ceremonies that accompany the retiring of unit colors. In short, the underlying assumptions of the leadership were obvious to all--mission first, people last. In this particular reorganization, mass confusion ensued when many members petitioned for transfers to units of their choice, some choosing units closer to their place of employment rather than their home. Some missed training assemblies during the process of transferring and most lost faith in the leadership and the military system. Some "good men" left the Guard rather than transfer to units that, in some instances, had been former unit rivals. Some left because they were told they were to be reduced in grade since the new unit was already over-graded.

It is almost axiomatic that assumptions that lie hidden beneath our consciousness are the essence of culture. One cannot deal with the culture of the organization unless one understands the basic assumptions operating in the decisionmaking process. However, one needs to actually observe the organization before one can understand it. This notion was reinforced in a particular study aimed at identifying the unique characteristics that go into making combat battalions excellent.

When three Army officers conducting a study asked a number of generals how they identified excellent battalions in the active Army, they discovered that the opinions of these senior Army leaders were based largely on their personal observations, *and then* they looked about for confirming evidence such as traditional measures which include the Unit Status Report.²⁵ Thus, it seems that excellence, or success is difficult to describe, much less measure. Observations by those who have travelled the road say that "gut" feelings coupled with cold, hard statistics must be a part of the equation.²⁶ Still, the importance of unconscious assumptions to the process of understanding unit readiness cannot be understated. The following is another example.

A former battalion commander told of a particular experience that occurred when he was first assigned to the position of Operations Office in a battalion, whose command philosophy differed greatly from his own. As the battalion Operations Officer, he was charged with developing training plans for the battalion. His biggest problem was to convince the battalion commander of the need for innovative, realistic and creative training. The battalion commander's preference was to keep it as simple as possible so that the troops could get through it with the least possible problems. For example, during Civil Disturbance training, the officer wanted to use the opposing forces concept to rigorously exercise the personnel of the organization undergoing riot control training. This was during the Sixties when civil unrest in communities and on campuses was constituting a major problem for law enforcement agencies.

Essentially, the officer believed that a realistic training situation whereby unit members would be exposed to the same shouts of obscenities, egg throwing and other actions of a violent mob would impress upon the members the need to exercise self-restraint. In essence, he was operating under the assumption that his unit could be called to duty tomorrow and it had to be ready.

The battalion commander, on the other hand, attempted to minimize the threat of potential call-up and declined to approve the officer's plan. He told him the opposing forces concept was too dangerous for the troops. He preferred, instead, that they "walk through" the exercise, which is simply going through the motions. For the commander, the assumptions he was operating under were quite different than that of the officer. For him, the units, which were located in a small, peaceful community, would never be called up, so there was no need to be so strict in training. These same assumptions were operating in other areas of his training as well. For example, during annual training, the battalion commander's complacent attitude permeated down through the chain of command and manifested itself in a lackadaisical approach to training realism. Invariably, the troops were late reaching their training sites, lacked enthusiasm, were sloppy and mediocre in their overall performance. Only when the battalion commander was replaced did the organization begin to show signs of im-

provement. This was primarily due, said the officer, to the new commander's commitment to making the battalion the best in the state.

In the final analysis, the Guard's culture, as can be seen from the surveys and the stories related above, is certainly real, and for those who are members, it certainly can be felt. It is predicated on a value system that places emphasis on the freedom of a citizen to pursue his own interests, while, at the same time, providing for the common defense of one's neighborhood, community, town, state and nation. And, it is the unique characteristic of the Guard, as a military establishment, its dual role as envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, that makes it such a formidable force.

Notes For Chapter V

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CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

As discussed earlier, readiness is more than simply counting beans, bullets and bodies. Congress, aware of the complexities and confusion surrounding the readiness of our military forces, tasked the General Accounting Office in the Fiscal Year 1985 Defense Authorization Act, to review the various readiness reporting systems within the Department of Defense. To date, the search continues in attempts to find better ways of measuring readiness. Throughout this study, the emphasis has been on identification of variables that can be critical to a combat unit's success on the battlefield, but heretofore, have gone unaddressed because they cannot be measured quantitatively, as can the other indicators such as equipment and personnel. Yet, these variables constitute the very fabric of the unit itself, and can serve as energizers in the unit's fighting capabilities. Some call it esprit de corps; others label it morale, and still others say it's the unit's elan. They are all of these and more, and they constitute the organization's "center of gravity," its culture. And, today, when billions of dollars are being spent on building Guard and Reserve readiness, it is imperative that the leadership, both in Congress and in the defense establishment, know and understand what actually constitutes readiness in terms of winning on the battlefield so that they can better ascertain whether the dollars are well spent. Of course, objective quantification and measurement is a necessity, but military preparedness, as has been argued in this paper, is more than counting. There is also a requirement for "disciplined subjectivity" that must be included in the readiness equation. To simply state that the Guard and Reserve are not ready because they do not have adequate equipment, personnel and training is insufficient and only begs the question: "What is readiness?" Until the Department of Defense can answer this question, there will continue to be confusion as to where priorities should be established--in the active component, the Guard and Reserve, or both? Should values such as courage, valor, patriotism and the will to fight and die for one's family, community and nation be included in the methodology used to determine readiness? And, if so, to what degree should they be included and how much weight should they carry? These are some of the questions that the Department of Defense needs to answer if it is to ensure the defense of our country and the prudent expenditure of limited dollars.

The concept of organizational culture and its impact on corporate success has captured the nation's imagination. It is, indeed, a powerful concept that certainly has utility not only in the civilian business world, but also in government and the military establishment. This is the reason for this study. The answers to the two questions posed should serve as beacons for the defense community, in particular, the Reserve components.

Is There A Distinct Guard Culture? Does Organizational Culture Affect Unit Readiness? The Answers

The answers to these questions, as indicated in this study, are a resounding "yes." What are the implications? For the active component, there needs to be an examination of assignment policies to ensure that leaders are in position long enough to make a difference in the organization. This will ultimately result in a greater degree of commitment by the leader and the led, and a higher level of cohesiveness. Additionally, costs of relocation will be drastically reduced thereby contributing to significant savings within the total military budget. Finally, the quality of military family life will be greatly enhanced because there will be less family relocations, school transfers and family separations.

For the Guard and Reserves, there needs to be a concerted effort to ensure the cultivation of its unique and distinct culture at the lowest level. Programs should be established whereby unit history, traditions and lineage become part of the unit's training program. Additionally, multiunit armories in large cities should be phased out in favor of single unit armories in suburban and rural areas. This will provide the unit commander with the

decentralization he requires to build and nurture a subculture, which can enhance the unit's performance. In other words, the Guard and Reserves should be examining themselves in terms of what their mission is during peace-time, and what they need to do in order to accomplish that mission. The leader with vision must come to the fore and establish the credo that will serve as the template for the Guard and Reserve's role in our nation's defense today and tomorrow. This vision needs to emanate at the top. For the Guard, this is the National Guard Bureau. This vision must filter down to the combat unit in rural America. Yet, all levels in between must have a part in the credo that evolves from that vision, if there is to be a strengthening of the culture. At the same time, there needs to be a closer relationship between the reserve components and the active establishment. The Total Force Policy must be more than the purchasing of modern equipment. It must also be a way of thinking and resolving problems. In effect, it must become part of the active and reserve culture, if it is to be a total success. The "we versus they" approach¹ that has traditionally existed between the active and reserve components, and which has been identified as being one of the major constraints to the development of a visible and credible reserve force must be eliminated. This "we versus they" attitude was evident during many of the interviews and discussions with both active and Guard personnel, particularly when discussing the Army's role in supervising the training of Guard and Reserve units.

The question of Guard and Reserve proficiency and professionalism seemed to be at the core of the problem. Under close analysis, however, this is not something new in active and reserve component relationships. Competition, tension and conflict between regulars and militia run through American history beginning during the Revolution.² John K. Mahon in his *History of the Militia and the National Guard* said of this conflict:

The pressures of war, starting with the Civil War and persisting through two world Wars, exacerbated it. In these, the officers trained in the military academies and others who had entered the professional caste by different means laid claims to the top commands, pushing military Guard leaders out of command of division, corps and armies.³

The friction existing between the active Army and the Guard in 1940, while building up for the war, was explained by Jim Dan Hill in *The Minuteman in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard*.

The Guard officers, primarily being a vocational and professional cross-section of American civil life and secondly soldiers as an avocational hobby with a sense of service, naturally represented a set of values, terms of reference and viewpoint different from those of the Regulars. Thus, the sudden merger of these two components of the Army of the United States into one active duty Army for a prospective twelve months resulted in what one may call a clash of military cultures, both in the same uniform and devoutly looking toward the same objectives, but separated by misconceptions.⁴

It is no surprise, then, to discover that many leaders in the active component and the Guard and Reserves today share similar conceptions and perceptions of each other. This is primarily due to the fact that many active component leaders do not fully understand the Guard and Reserves in terms of "who" they are and what they really are capable of doing. This was borne out in a survey of The National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces students on their attitudes and perceptions of the Reserve Components in 1982. These two institutions represent the highest level of military education offered by the defense establishment for its future leaders. The study revealed that a majority of the respondents were unaware of reserve component missions and roles. A large portion, almost half, believed that Reserve Component forces are poorly and improperly utilized. A typical comment was that "Guard and Reserves should be confined to serving as fillers for active units." Thus, one of the conclusions of the authors of the study was that:

Reserve components suffer unnecessarily through ignorance and biased treatment on the part of the regulars. Those who know and work with the reserves have very favorable impressions. Other regulars tend to view reserves as "part-time" workers who do not belong in the military club, and they fail to understand the need of Reservists to identify with both the military and civilian worlds.⁵

Implications For Guard and Reserve

To summarize, the implications of this study for the Guard and Reserves center on heightening awareness to the importance of organizational culture to unit readiness. The impact of strong organizational culture on unit performance during peacetime can be very positive for the Guard and Reserve as well as the active component. By itself, however, organizational culture will not ensure success on the battlefield. The other variables of the equation such as strong leadership, popular support for the cause, proper equipment and so forth all must be present. But, what has been illustrated in this study is the fact that the active component and the Guard and Reserves are, indeed, *one* culture, albeit, with attendant subcultures. Thus, a Total Force Policy is, indeed, viable if all parties concerned make a concerted effort to end the rivalry and focus on building and strengthening their relationships. What is needed is better education of the active component leadership at all levels in terms of the Guard, its strengths as well as its weaknesses. Certainly there are differences between the active component and the Guard that, by their very nature, emphasize the distinctiveness of each. For example, the very fact that the Guard is a reserve force is, in itself, one such distinctive feature. However, in resolving the rivalry, what is needed also is what Mary Parker Follett describes as "fruitful difference."⁶ By this is meant that scientific information for decision-making as well as "hard" facts are necessary but, by themselves, they are insufficient. "The object of accurate information is not to overcome difference but to give legitimate play to difference."⁷ Thus, rather than attempt to emphasize the differences between active and reserve, which often leads to conflict, there should be an "integration" of things desired so that neither side has had to sacrifice anything.⁸ In essence, to claim that the Guard is not combat ready because it does not have sufficient and modern equipment nor enough trained personnel may not be as factual as appears on the surface. Why? Because the statement is predicated on the assumption that combat readiness is the sum of the equipment, training and personnel variables that are part of the readiness reporting system. The disregard for other possible variables of the readiness equation such as the unit's culture ignores the distinction between organizations and may, in fact, distort the entire perception of readiness which can certainly adversely impact decisions regarding defense.

On the battlefield, there will be no distinction between Guard, Reserve or active Army soldiers--they will all be wearing the same uniform and sharing the same fear and horror that accompanies battle. As Eliot A. Cohen says:

... above all, the experience of combat makes the difference between regular soldiers and citizen-soldiers, volunteers and conscripts unimportant. The crucial distinction becomes that between those who are combat veterans and those who are not. The shared horrors, hardships and rare elation of the battlefield mean more to men than why they ended up there.⁹

Impact on Public Administration

Public Administration is concerned with the administration of governmental affairs. It is bureaucracy and, as Fesler says, "large-scale administration."¹⁰

Like all organizations, bureaucratic included, the military strives for increased productivity and excellence. Although the main focus, to date, has been on areas that lend themselves to quantification in measurable terms, there is some evidence to suggest that other variables exist that are less quantifiable but that can contribute to organizational goals and objectives. A cultural view of organizations can identify these variables and assist leadership in negotiating changes within the organization that can align the organizational culture with objectives.

The notion that organization efficiency can be enhanced by a strong organizational culture has, for the most part, confined itself to analysis of private organizations, where profit is the principal objective. However, in this study, organizational culture was examined in the Guard, which is a military organization. The question whether the concept can also be applied to bureaucratic organizations, as a whole, appears to be answered in the affirmative, but with some limitations. For example, diagnosing organizational culture is a long, time-consuming

process. Since the organization's culture is implied in concrete behavior examples such as daily routines, stories, rituals, and language, a significant amount of time is necessary to spend with the organization "observing, sifting through, and asking people about their cultural outcroppings in order to understand their significance for organization members."¹¹

The implications for change within organizations are significant. Public organizations are, in actuality, less in control of their environment than are private organizations. Control over hiring and firing employees, for example, is much more limited in government than in the private sector. Thus, change in organizational culture for bureaucratic organizations may be more difficult. As mentioned earlier, public administration is "large-scale administration." This, in itself, can create obstacles to building and maintaining strong organizational cultures that are subsets of the overall bureaucratic culture, which by itself, can be negative as well as positive. Wilkins and Ouchi suggest that organizational culture will be stronger in smaller professional or functional groups or relatively small organizations.¹² Also, the longer the history of a unit with somewhat stable membership, the more likely that organizational culture can be nurtured.¹³ However, what these authors also suggest is that "culture in organizations will more likely develop when contradictory social institutions are absent or discounted."¹⁴ What this means is that organizations characterized by a long history and stable membership, but in which members are exposed to significantly different cultural alternatives, can experience difficulty in attempts to change the existing organizational culture. In government, the existence of a negative bureaucratic culture, for example, can impede any attempts to develop a new or different culture. By negative bureaucracy is meant, in the words of Dwight Waldo, "... clumsy, unfeeling, unknowing, irrational."¹⁵ Thus, for the concept of organizational culture to be effectively used in bureaucratic organizations, public administrators need to fully understand its strengths and weaknesses and that it is not simply another organization development technique, nor another tool for organization change and effectiveness. It is certainly these and much more. It is the essence of the organization--its personality. It is complex and sensitive. As mentioned earlier, change in any one area can effect other areas of the organization, as well. It is pervasive and real. It can be influenced, managed and changed. And, if left alone, it can slowly disintegrate. It is not, by itself, the panacea for resolution of all organizational problems. It is a way of understanding the organization, and when it is understood, the administrator can better predict how the organization will behave.¹⁶

Public administration can learn from studying organizations as "culture-bearing milieux."¹⁷ To organizational behaviorist, Meryl Reis Louis:

... it seems increasingly clear that much, if not most, of what matters in organizational life takes place at the cultural level. From the "informal organization" first recognized in the Hawthorne studies to the "organizational politics" currently in vogue among researchers, cultural phenomena are pervasive throughout organizational life.¹⁸

Louis' cultural perspective is based on a social definition paradigm in which phenomena of interest are characterized as intersubjective, emergent, context-embedded and interpretive.¹⁹ As is evidenced in the literature cited earlier, there is a current interest today in studying symbolic and cultural phenomena in organizations using an intersubjective frame of reference in which meaning emanates from direct interaction among organizational members. Public Administrators, the practitioners of federal, state and local governmental agencies can also adopt the same guiding principles of the participative management philosophy that undergirds the concept of organizational culture and strive for excellence within their organizations. But, in order to do so, the traditional analytic research strategy epitomized, for example, by survey research needs to be augmented with strategies that touch on contextual aspects of phenomena and the perspectives of organizational members, avoiding objectifying intersubjective phenomena and considering critical issues of boundary and perspective.²⁰ In short, public administrators must balance rational objectivity with disciplined subjectivity. In addition, the importance of value-shaping and group solidarity, or cohesiveness, must be made a matter of special emphasis in this process. To the military, cohesiveness is a critical component of unit effectiveness. The same is true of all organizations as well.

Notes For Chapter VI

¹Martin Binkin, *U.S. Reserve Forces: The Problem of the Weekend Warrior—A Staff Paper* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 13, quoting a statement by Dr. Theodore C. Marrs, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs in *FY 1973 Authorizations for Military Procurement* for the Senate Hearing (Part 3), p. 1625.

²John K. Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1983), p. 262.

³*Ibid.*

⁴Jim Dan Hill, *The Minuteman in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard* (Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1964), p. 404.

⁵James W. Browning, II, Kenneth C. Carlson, Robert L. Goldich, Neal F. Herbert, Theodore R. Mosch, Gordon R. Perkins, and Gerald W. Swartzbaugh, "The U.S. Reserve System: Attitudes, Perceptions, and Realities," *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force*, ed. Bennie J. Wilson, III (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985), pp. 67-86.

⁶Mary Parker Follett, *Creative Experience* (New York: Peter Smith, 1951), p. 6 (original copyright by Longmans, Green and Company, 1924).

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸Henry C. Metcalf and L. Urwick, eds., *Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett* (New York: Harper Brothers Publishers, 1940), p. 32.

⁹Eliot Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 36.

¹⁰James E. Fesler, *Public Administration: Theory and Practice* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), p. 6.

¹¹Edgar F. Huse and Thomas G. Cummings, *Organization Development and Change*, 3rd ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1985), p. 356.

¹²Alan L. Wilkins and William G. Ouchi, "Efficient Cultures: Exploring the Relationship Between Culture and Organizational Performance," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 28 (1983):469-481.

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 473.

¹⁵Dwight Waldo, *The Enterprise of Public Administration* (California: Chandler and Sharp Publishers, Inc., 1981), p. 41.

¹⁶Nancy Foy, *The Yin and Yang of Organizations* (New York: William Morrow Company, 1980), p. 153.

¹⁷Meryl Reis Louis, "A Cultural Perspective on Organizations: The Need for and Consequences of Viewing Organizations as Culture-Bearing Milieux," *Human Systems Management* (North-Holland Publishing Company, 1981), pp. 246-258.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 250.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 257.

²⁰Meryl Reis Louis, "Organizations as Culture-Bearing Milieux," *Organizational Symbolism*, ed. Louis R. Pandy (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1983), p. 51.

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APPENDIX A

COMPARISON OF CORE SOLDIER VALUES

Active Component (AC) and National Guard (NG)
AC: N = 4000; NG: N = 726

	Not At All Important	Slightly Important	Somewhat Important	Moderately Important	Quite Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
2. Loyalty to the United States (Army) (Guard)							
AC	2.25	2.93	4.97	10.09	15.09	25.84	38.83
NG	1.52	1.11	5.82	7.34	14.54	29.78	39.89
3. Loyalty to your unit or organization							
AC	6.35	4.36	7.69	13.24	18.52	22.47	27.37
NG	1.53	0.97	4.58	6.11	13.89	32.50	40.42
5. Putting what is good for your fellow soldiers, unit and the nation before your own welfare							
AC	4.49	4.43	8.55	14.94	19.69	26.46	21.44
NG	2.91	1.80	5.69	10.96	21.36	33.43	23.86
7. Commitment to working as a member of a team							
AC	1.75	1.96	4.09	9.32	19.16	28.98	34.74
NG	0.97	0.56	3.32	4.70	15.21	39.00	36.24
8. Dedication to learning your job and doing it well							
AC	1.36	1.51	2.05	4.48	12.59	26.65	51.36
NG	0.42	0.69	0.97	2.64	11.10	33.29	50.90
9. Personal drive to succeed in your work and advance							
AC	1.40	0.98	2.56	4.76	11.49	25.62	53.19
NG	0.55	0.83	1.11	4.43	14.40	30.61	48.06
11. Being disciplined and courageous in battle							
AC	1.99	1.69	3.06	7.19	14.40	25.62	46.05
NG	0.98	1.53	2.51	5.86	10.04	30.40	48.68
31. Building and maintaining physical fitness and stamina							
AC	1.50	1.23	3.48	7.65	16.29	27.62	42.23
NG	1.40	1.54	1.96	9.50	17.46	31.98	36.17

APPENDIX B

COMPARISON OF CORE AMERICAN VALUES

Active Component (AC) and National Guard (NG)

AC: N = 4000; NG: N = 726

	Not At All Important	Slightly Important	Somewhat Important	Moderately Important	Quite Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1. Loyalty to the United States							
AC	0.59	0.71	0.66	4.07	8.90	21.13	62.94
NG	0.55	0.69	1.25	1.66	5.68	16.90	73.27
6. Risk life in defense of country							
AC	2.94	2.58	4.21	8.10	13.85	25.19	43.13
NG	1.79	1.32	3.86	4.69	11.72	30.76	45.66
13. The Constitution of the United States							
AC	1.19	1.07	3.05	7.32	15.12	23.91	48.34
NG	1.39	0.69	1.25	3.61	8.32	21.50	63.25
14. Freedom of Religion							
AC	2.94	1.25	3.03	7.21	11.42	18.04	56.11
NG	2.35	2.63	3.19	4.71	10.80	22.44	53.88
15. Freedom of Speech							
AC	0.50	0.50	1.40	4.87	10.56	19.17	63.00
NG	0.97	0.83	1.94	5.13	9.85	22.88	58.39
16. Freedom of the Press							
AC	5.03	3.16	6.04	11.90	15.18	18.54	40.15
NG	4.98	4.01	7.19	11.20	13.28	19.78	39.56
17. The right of the people to keep and bear arms							
AC	3.95	2.01	4.34	9.12	10.84	16.09	53.65
NG	6.81	4.72	7.50	10.42	10.56	19.86	40.14
18. Being able to vote in local, state, and federal elections							
AC	3.21	1.54	4.16	8.37	13.51	19.86	49.35
NG	2.21	1.52	4.28	5.25	8.84	22.10	55.80
19. Civilian control of the military							
AC	26.46	6.46	9.14	14.19	12.11	11.37	20.27
NG	23.50	8.07	10.29	11.82	12.10	13.07	21.14

20. The responsibility of each citizen for the defense of the country

AC	2.49	2.03	3.65	8.81	14.21	21.51	47.30
NG	1.66	1.24	4.56	6.08	10.77	28.18	47.51

23. A Military Justice System which is fair

AC	3.35	1.16	2.52	5.22	9.97	19.31	58.47
NG	1.80	1.24	2.90	4.43	11.34	30.98	47.30

24. Fast evacuation and good medical care for wounded

AC	1.30	0.53	1.34	3.29	7.12	16.46	69.96
NG	0.55	1.39	1.52	1.80	5.96	20.08	68.70

APPENDIX C **COHESION (HORIZONTAL BONDING) COMPARISON: ACTIVE COMPONENT** **AND NATIONAL GUARD**

This appendix compares cohesiveness of active Army sample and Guard sample.
(Cohesion *among* followers)
(AC = active Army; NG = National Guard)

92. In general, how do you feel about the people you work with?

	I Do Not Like Them At All	I Do Not Like Them Very Much	I Think They Are OK	I Like Them A Lot
AC69	3.31	52.28	43.72
NG	1.03	3.09	58.76	37.11

93. In my unit, most of the soldiers care about what happens to each other.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Not Sure	Agree	Strongly Agree
AC	2.76	9.24	21.52	45.93	20.55
NG	2.75	9.62	25.43	43.30	18.90

94. I do not trust the other soldiers in my unit.

	Disagree	Not Really Sure	Agree
AC	51.46	35.33	13.21
NG	41.38	46.21	12.41

95. Do the soldiers in your unit make each other feel like doing a good job?

	Very Little, Not At All	Little	Somewhat	Much	Very Much
AC	4.58	9.02	36.89	29.13	20.39
NG	4.86	13.19	37.50	25.69	18.75

96. How well do the soldiers in your unit work together?

	Very Poorly	Poorly	Borderline	Well	Very Well
AC	1.25	4.02	17.75	47.85	29.13
NG	1.74	4.17	21.88	41.67	30.56

97. On the average, how well do the soldiers you work with do their jobs?

	Very Poorly	Poorly	Borderline	Well	Very Well
AC69	3.32	17.04	54.71	24.24
NG34	3.45	15.86	53.45	26.90

98. How many soldiers in your unit do you think are good soldiers?

	None Are	Very Few Are	Some Are	Most Are	All Are
AC70	6.82	21.97	60.78	9.74
NG35	6.25	25.69	56.60	11.11

99. How many soldiers in your unit perform so poorly that the unit might be better off without them?

	All Are	Most Are	Some Are	Very Few Are	None Are
AC	2.78	4.03	30.28	52.78	10.14
NG	2.77	3.81	28.72	51.90	12.80

100. How often do the members of your unit work hard to get things done?

	Never Time	Seldom	Sometimes	Most Of The	Always
AC	1.39	5.27	20.80	50.07	22.47
NG	1.38	5.86	21.03	45.86	25.86

APPENDIX D **COHESION (VERTICAL BONDING) COMPARISON: ACTIVE COMPONENT AND** **NATIONAL GUARD**

This appendix compares cohesiveness of active Army sample and Guard sample.
(Cohesion *between* followers and leaders.)

(AC = active Army; NG = National Guard)

110. When I go for help, my immediate leader listens well and cares about what I say.

	Not Very Often	Sometimes	Most Of The Time	Always
AC	7.22	15.97	36.81	40.00
NG	6.90	17.93	33.45	41.72

111. My immediate leader really understands the soldiers in the unit.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
AC	3.49	8.65	25.10	43.10	19.67
NG	2.77	9.69	26.64	40.14	20.76

112. When I want to talk, my immediate leader makes himself available.

	Never	Not Very Often	Sometime	Most Of The Time	Always
AC	2.23	6.26	17.39	37.69	36.44
NG	2.07	8.28	20.34	34.14	35.17

113. Overall, my immediate leader does a very good job.

	Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Borderline	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
AC	3.08	3.08	11.06	35.29	47.48
NG	2.08	4.15	10.38	34.60	48.79

114. My immediate leader is such a good soldier, he can show us how to best perform our tasks.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Borderline	Agree	Strongly Agree
AC	3.64	8.25	23.22	44.06	20.84
NG	2.42	9.69	23.53	42.91	21.45

115. My immediate leader makes me feel like a "winner" when I do something well.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Borderline	Agree	Strongly Agree
AC	4.47	8.24	26.54	41.34	19.41
NG	4.48	10.34	31.72	36.55	16.90

APPENDIX E

COMPARISON OF CORE SOLDIER VALUES

Battalion A (Bn A) and Battalion B (Bn B)
Bn A: N = 198; Bn B: N = 244

	Not At All Important	Slightly Important	Somewhat Important	Moderately Important	Quite Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
2. Loyalty to the Army National Guard							
Bn A	2.60	0.52	4.17	5.73	13.02	24.48	49.48
Bn B	1.88	1.88	8.65	9.02	16.17	32.33	30.08
3. Loyalty to your unit or organization							
Bn A	1.58	1.05	3.68	3.68	8.42	27.37	54.21
Bn B	2.26	1.13	7.14	7.89	15.04	32.33	34.21
4. Taking responsibility for your actions and decisions							
Bn A	1.05	0.00	1.58	1.58	6.84	21.58	67.37
Bn B	1.13	0.38	2.26	3.76	7.89	29.70	54.89
7. Commitment to working as a team							
Bn A	2.07	0.52	1.04	3.63	12.44	33.68	46.63
Bn B	0.75	0.75	6.39	7.14	15.79	39.47	29.70
8. Dedication to learning your job and doing it well							
Bn A	0.52	1.04	0.52	2.07	10.36	30.05	55.44
Bn B	0.76	0.76	1.52	3.79	15.53	31.06	46.59
9. Personal drive to succeed in your work and advance							
Bn A	0.52	1.04	2.07	4.15	12.44	29.53	50.26
Bn B	1.13	0.75	1.13	4.51	16.54	30.45	45.69
11. Being disciplined and courageous in battle							
Bn A	1.04	0.00	1.56	4.69	6.25	26.04	60.42
Bn B	1.53	3.05	4.58	8.40	12.98	29.39	40.08
31. Building and maintaining physical fitness and stamina							
Bn A	1.05	0.53	2.63	5.79	13.16	33.68	43.16
Bn B	3.04	3.04	2.28	9.89	16.73	31.18	33.84

APPENDIX F

COMPARISON OF CORE AMERICAN VALUES

Battalion A (Bn A) and Battalion B (Bn B)
Bn A: N = 198; Bn B: N = 244

	Not At All Important	Slightly Important	Somewhat Important	Moderately Important	Quite Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
1. Loyalty to the United States							
Bn A	0.52	1.04	1.04	0.52	4.17	15.63	77.08
Bn B	1.13	1.13	1.88	3.76	9.40	18.80	63.91
6. Dedication to serving the United States, even to risking your life in its defense							
Bn A	1.54	1.03	4.62	5.13	7.18	25.13	55.38
Bn B	3.38	3.38	4.89	7.14	14.66	33.83	32.71
13. The Constitution of the United States							
Bn A	2.59	1.55	1.04	3.11	9.84	17.62	64.25
Bn B	1.89	0.76	2.27	6.06	10.23	18.94	59.85
14. Freedom of Religion							
Bn A	2.59	2.07	4.66	5.18	7.25	29.53	48.70
Bn B	3.38	4.51	3.01	4.14	13.53	16.54	54.89
15. Freedom of Speech							
Bn A	1.04	1.04	3.13	3.13	7.81	24.48	59.38
Bn B	0.75	1.13	2.26	8.27	10.15	18.05	59.40
16. Freedom of the Press							
Bn A	8.76	3.09	7.23	5.67	12.37	24.23	38.14
Bn B	5.64	3.89	6.39	12.78	14.29	15.41	40.60
17. The right of the people to keep and bear arms							
Bn A	9.90	6.25	10.42	6.77	9.38	21.88	35.42
Bn B	7.92	4.53	9.06	10.57	10.94	16.60	40.38
18. Being able to vote in local, state and federal elections							
Bn A	4.12	2.58	5.15	6.19	11.34	17.53	53.09
Bn B	1.88	1.13	5.26	6.02	10.15	22.93	52.63
19. Civilian control of the military							
Bn A	35.60	5.24	9.95	6.28	12.57	10.47	19.90
Bn B	21.51	7.55	11.32	10.57	13.58	13.96	21.51

20. The responsibility of each citizen for the defense of the country

Bn A	3.08	1.54	4.62	3.59	10.26	26.15	50.77
Bn B	1.88	1.88	7.52	8.27	12.03	26.32	42.11

23. A Military Justice System which is fair

Bn A	2.59	1.55	1.04	4.66	10.36	27.98	51.81
Bn B	2.63	1.88	6.02	4.89	13.91	29.32	41.35

24. Fast evacuation and good medical care for the wounded

Bn A	1.55	1.55	1.55	1.03	5.15	15.46	73.71
Bn B	0.38	1.89	3.02	1.89	5.28	21.13	66.42

APPENDIX G **LEADERS (OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS) AND** **FOLLOWERS (ENLISTED PERSONNEL GRADES E-4 AND BELOW):** **PERCEPTIONS OF EACH OTHER IN BATTALION A AND** **BATTALION B**

Note: Percent of Followers who perceive the values as being very important to their Leaders and Percent of Leaders who perceive the values as being very important to their Followers.

	<u>Followers' Perceptions of Leaders</u>	<u>Leaders' Perceptions of Followers</u>
1. Loyalty to the United States	Battalion A - 79% Battalion B - 70%	Battalion A - 73% Battalion B - 62%
2. Loyalty to the Army National Guard	Battalion A - 72% Battalion B - 56%	Battalion A - 67% Battalion B - 51%
3. Loyalty to their unit or organization	Battalion A - 73% Battalion B - 55%	Battalion A - 73% Battalion B - 57%
4. Taking responsibility for their actions and decisions	Battalion A - 65% Battalion B - 55%	Battalion A - 67% Battalion B - 48%
5. Putting what is good for their fellow soldiers, unit, and the nation before their own welfare	Battalion A - 59% Battalion B - 44%	Battalion A - 61% Battalion B - 42%
6. Dedication to serving the United States, even to risking their lives in its defense	Battalion A - 62% Battalion B - 53%	Battalion A - 64% Battalion B - 41%
7. Commitment to working as a team	Battalion A - 68% Battalion B - 52%	Battalion A - 65% Battalion B - 55%
8. Dedication to learning their jobs and doing them well	Battalion A - 73% Battalion B - 56%	Battalion A - 67% Battalion B - 55%
9. Being honest, open, and truthful	Battalion A - 70% Battalion B - 52%	Battalion A - 63% Battalion B - 52%
10. Being disciplined and courageous in battle	Battalion A - 71% Battalion B - 51%	Battalion A - 70% Battalion B - 50%

11. Standing up for what they believe is right	Battalion A - 74%	Battalion A - 75%
	Battalion B - 60%	Battalion B - 64%
12. Personal drive to succeed and advance in their unit	Battalion A - 70%	Battalion A - 66%
	Battalion B - 59%	Battalion B - 53%
13. Treating all soldiers fairly	Battalion A - 71%	Battalion A - 69%
	Battalion B - 49%	Battalion B - 61%
14. Working with others tactfully and with military courtesy	Battalion A - 67%	Battalion A - 59%
	Battalion B - 48%	Battalion B - 46%
15. Exhibiting military bearing and appearance	Battalion A - 63%	Battalion A - 55%
	Battalion B - 52%	Battalion B - 43%
16. High moral standards both on and off duty	Battalion A - 60%	Battalion A - 61%
	Battalion B - 43%	Battalion B - 45%
17. Using initiative and imagination in solving problems	Battalion A - 61%	Battalion A - 62%
	Battalion B - 47%	Battalion B - 48%
18. Building and maintaining physical fitness and stamina	Battalion A - 59%	Battalion A - 60%
	Battalion B - 43%	Battalion B - 38%
19. Economic Security	Battalion A - 65%	Battalion A - 65%
	Battalion B - 52%	Battalion B - 56%
20. Being able to rest or go home when their job is done	Battalion A - 74%	Battalion A - 76%
	Battalion B - 65%	Battalion B - 72%

APPENDIX H

COHESION (HORIZONTAL BONDING) COMPARISON: BATTALION A AND BATTALION B

This appendix compares cohesion (Horizontal Bonding: Cohesiveness among members) of Battalion A (Bn A) and Battalion B (Bn B). Respondents are soldiers (followers), which do not include officers and non-commissioned officers.

92. In general, how do you feel about the people you work with?

	I Do Not Like Them At All	I Do Not Like Them Very Much	I Think They Are OK	I Like Them A Lot
Bn A	2.44	2.44	69.51	25.61
Bn B	0.78	3.88	62.02	33.33

93. In my unit, most of the soldiers care about what happens to each other.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Not Sure	Agree	Strongly Agree
Bn A	4.88	10.98	26.83	37.80	19.51
Bn B	1.55	9.30	25.58	50.39	13.18

94. I do not trust the other soldiers in my unit.

	Disagree	Not Really Sure	Agree
Bn A	29.27	54.88	15.85
Bn B	39.06	46.88	14.06

95. Do the soldiers in your unit make each other feel like doing a good job?

	Very Little, Not At All	Little	Somewhat	Much	Very Much
Bn A	7.41	16.05	35.80	20.99	19.75
Bn B	3.94	14.96	44.88	24.41	11.81

96. How well do the soldiers in your unit work together?

	Very Poorly	Poorly	Borderline	Well	Very Well
Bn A	0.00	3.75	31.25	37.50	27.50
Bn B	3.91	4.69	32.66	42.97	25.78

97. On the average, how well do the soldiers you work with do their jobs?

	Very Poorly	Poorly	Borderline	Well	Very Well
Bn A	0.00	1.23	16.05	62.96	19.75
Bn B	0.78	5.43	18.60	50.39	24.81

98. How many soldiers in your unit do you think are good soldiers?

	None Are	Very Few Are	Some Are	Most Are	All Are
Bn A	0.00	8.75	27.50	51.25	12.50
Bn B	0.78	7.81	23.44	59.38	8.59

99. How many soldiers in your unit perform so poorly that the unit might be better off without them?

	All Are	Most Are	Some Are	Very Few Are	None Are
Bn A	5.00	6.25	32.50	47.50	8.75
Bn B	3.10	3.10	30.23	51.16	12.40

100. How often do the members of your unit work hard to get things done?

	Never	Seldom	Sometimes	Most Of The Time	Always
Bn A	0.00	9.88	18.52	48.15	23.46
Bn B	2.33	6.20	25.58	44.96	20.93

APPENDIX I **COHESION (VERTICAL BONDING) COMPARISON:** **BATTALION A AND BATTALION B**

This appendix compares cohesion (Vertical Bonding: Cohesiveness between followers and leaders) of Battalion A (Bn A) and Battalion B (Bn B). Respondents are soldiers (followers), which do not include officers and non-commissioned officers.

110. When I go for help, my immediate leader listens well and cares about what I say.

	Not Very Often	Sometimes	Most Of The Time	Always
Bn A	4.94	17.23	35.80	41.98
Bn B	7.75	22.48	36.43	33.33

111. My immediate leader really understands the soldiers in the unit.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Bn A	2.47	11.11	32.10	35.80	18.52
Bn B	3.10	7.75	27.13	48.06	13.95

112. When I want to talk, my immediate leader makes himself available.

	Never	Not Very Often	Sometimes	Most Of The Time	Always
Bn A	2.47	4.94	24.69	37.04	30.86
Bn B	2.33	10.85	24.81	31.01	31.01

113. Overall, my immediate leader does a very good job.

	Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Borderline	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
Bn A	2.50	3.75	10.00	40.24	29.27
Bn B	3.10	5.43	11.63	35.66	44.19

114. My immediate leader is such a good soldier, he can show us how to best perform our tasks.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Borderline	Strongly Agree
Bn A	0.00	6.10	24.39	29.27
Bn B	3.88	10.85	25.58	12.40

115. My immediate leader makes me feel like a "winner" when I do something well.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Borderline	Agree	Strongly Agree
Bn A	3.66	9.76	32.93	36.59	17.07
Bn B	6.20	10.85	37.21	35.66	10.08

APPENDIX J

SURVEY OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL: WHAT YOU CONSIDER AS IMPORTANT

This questionnaire seeks your responses to questions that deal with values. Providing this information is strictly voluntary and failure to respond to any particular question will not result in any penalty for the respondent. The information collected in this survey will be used for research and analysis purposes only. To ensure confidentiality, there is no requirement for you to identify yourself. Please be totally honest and candid in your responses.

Pay careful attention to the directions for each part of the questionnaire. Generally, you will indicate your response by placing the letter of your choice next to the item being rated or by circling the letter of your choice. Please read the directions before each part of the questionnaire. For example, certain questions ask you to choose among opposing views:

- A = not at all important
- B = slightly important
- C = somewhat important
- D = moderately important
- E = quite important
- F = very important
- G = extremely important

EXAMPLE

Use the scale above to rate HOW IMPORTANT EACH OF THE FOLLOWING IS TO YOU *PERSONALLY*. Place the *letter* of your choice on the line next to the item being rated.

- ___ 1. Freedom.
- ___ 2. A world of beauty.

SECTION ONE

Use the scale below to rate HOW IMPORTANT EACH OF THE FOLLOWING IS TO YOU *PERSONALLY* and write the *letter* of your choice on the line next to the item being rated.

- A = not at all important
- B = slightly important
- C = somewhat important
- D = moderately important
- E = quite important
- F = very important
- G = extremely important

- ___ 1. Loyalty to the United States.
- ___ 2. Loyalty to the Army National Guard.
- ___ 3. Loyalty to your unit or organization.
- ___ 4. Taking responsibility for your actions and decisions.

- A = not at all important
- B = slightly important
- C = somewhat important
- D = moderately important
- E = quite important
- F = very important
- G = extremely important

- ___ 5. Putting what is good for your fellow soldiers, unit, and the nation before your own welfare.
- ___ 6. Dedication to serving the United States, even to risking your life in its defense.
- ___ 7. Commitment to working as a member of a team.
- ___ 8. Dedication to learning your job and doing it well.
- ___ 9. Personal drive to succeed in your work and advance.
- ___ 10. Being honest, open, and truthful.
- ___ 11. Being disciplined and courageous in battle.
- ___ 12. Standing up for what you firmly believe is right.
- ___ 13. The Constitution of the United States.
- ___ 14. Freedom of religion.
- ___ 15. Freedom of speech.
- ___ 16. Freedom of the press.
- ___ 17. The right of the people to keep and bear arms.
- ___ 18. Being able to vote in local, state, and federal elections.
- ___ 19. Civilian control of the military.
- ___ 20. The responsibility of each citizen for the defense of the country.
- ___ 21. The Army National Guard.
- ___ 22. The Army Guard's concern for soldiers' well-being.
 - A = not at all important
 - B = slightly important
 - C = somewhat important
 - D = moderately important
 - E = quite important
 - F = very important
 - G = extremely important
- ___ 23. A military justice system which is fair.
- ___ 24. Fast evacuation and good medical care for wounded.
- ___ 25. Treating all soldiers fairly.
- ___ 26. Communicating effectively in writing and speaking.
- ___ 27. Working with others tactfully and with military courtesy.
- ___ 28. Exhibiting excellent military bearing and appearance.
- ___ 29. High moral standards.
- ___ 30. Using initiative and imagination in solving problems.
- ___ 31. Building and maintaining physical fitness and stamina.
- ___ 32. Economic security.
- ___ 33. Wealth and luxury.
- ___ 34. Living close to your relatives and close friends.
- ___ 35. Being able to rest or go home when your job is done.
- ___ 36. Being able to relax and enjoy yourself.

SECTION TWO

Based on your observations, HOW IMPORTANT IS EACH OF THE FOLLOWING TO THE OFFICERS AND NCOs IN YOUR UNIT?

- A = not at all important
- B = slightly important
- C = somewhat important
- D = moderately important
- E = quite important
- F = very important
- G = extremely important

- ___ 37. Loyalty to the United States.
 - ___ 38. Loyalty to the Army National Guard.
 - ___ 39. Loyalty to their unit or organization.
 - ___ 40. Taking responsibility for their actions and decisions.
 - ___ 41. Putting what is good for their fellow soldiers, units, and the nation before their own welfare.
 - ___ 42. Dedication to serving the United States, even to risking their lives in its defense.
 - ___ 43. Commitment to working as a team.
 - ___ 44. Dedication to learning their jobs and doing them well.
 - ___ 45. Being honest, open, and truthful.
 - ___ 46. Being disciplined and courageous in battle.
 - ___ 47. Standing up for what they firmly believe is right.
 - ___ 48. Personal drive to succeed and advance in their unit.
 - ___ 49. Treating all soldiers fairly.
 - ___ 50. Working with others tactfully and with military courtesy.
 - ___ 51. Exhibiting military bearing and appearance.
- A = not at all important
 - B = slightly important
 - C = somewhat important
 - D = moderately important
 - E = quite important
 - F = very important
 - G = extremely important
- ___ 52. High moral standards both on and off duty.
 - ___ 53. Using initiative and imagination in solving problems.
 - ___ 54. Building and maintaining physical fitness and stamina.
 - ___ 55. Economic security.
 - ___ 56. Being able to rest or go home when their job is done.

SECTION THREE

(THIS SECTION IS TO BE COMPLETED BY OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ONLY)

Based on your observations, HOW IMPORTANT IS EACH OF THE FOLLOWING *TO THE SOLDIERS THAT YOU LEAD?*

(Remember to write the *letter* of your choice on the line next to the items being rated.)

- A = not at all important
- B = slightly important
- C = somewhat important
- D = moderately important
- E = quite important
- F = very important
- G = extremely important

- ___ 57. Loyalty to the United States.
- ___ 58. Loyalty to the Army National Guard.
- ___ 59. Loyalty to their unit or organization.
- ___ 60. Taking responsibility for their actions and decisions.
- ___ 61. Putting what is good for their fellow soldiers, unit, and the nation before their own welfare.
- ___ 62. Dedication to serving the United States, even to risking their lives in its defense.
- ___ 63. Commitment to working as a team.
- ___ 64. Dedication to learning their jobs and doing them well.
- ___ 65. Being honest, open, and truthful.
- ___ 66. Being disciplined and courageous in a battle.
- ___ 67. Standing up for what they firmly believe is right.
 - A = not at all important
 - B = slightly important
 - C = somewhat important
 - D = moderately important
 - E = quite important
 - F = very important
 - G = extremely important
- ___ 68. Personal drive to succeed and advance in their unit.
- ___ 69. Treating all soldiers fairly.
- ___ 70. Working with others tactfully and with military courtesy.
- ___ 71. Exhibiting military bearing and appearance.
- ___ 72. High moral standards both on and off duty.
- ___ 73. Using initiative and imagination in solving problems.
- ___ 74. Building and maintaining physical fitness and stamina.
- ___ 75. Economic security.
- ___ 76. Being able to rest or go home when their job is done.

SECTION FOUR

This section addresses some of your general opinions about the Army National Guard. Use the scale below to rate HOW MUCH YOU PERSONALLY AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH EACH ITEM and write the *letter* of your choice on the line next to the item being rated.

- A = strongly agree
- B = agree
- C = borderline
- D = disagree
- E = strongly disagree

- ___ 77. I wish that more soldiers really cared about national security.
- ___ 78. A person can get more of an even break as a civilian than as a soldier.
- ___ 79. Lower ranking soldiers need to be supervised more.
- ___ 80. There is not enough discipline in the Army Guard.
- ___ 81. If I got out of the Army Guard today, it would be hard to find a civilian job as good as the job I have now.
- ___ 82. My supervisor makes me do too many things that are not related to my job.
- ___ 83. In general, an Army post is a good place to live.
- ___ 84. Soldiers should have more interest in mission accomplishment and less interest in their personal concerns.
- ___ 85. No one should be compelled to take an assignment he or she does not want.
- ___ 86. What a member of the Armed Forces does in his or her own time is none of the military's business.
- ___ 87. Personal interests and wishes must take second place to operational requirements for military personnel.
- ___ 88. The Army Guard has a positive image in the community.
- ___ 89. The training in the Army National Guard is good.
- ___ 90. The Army National Guard should train where it will be deployed in combat.
- ___ 91. The Army National Guard soldier is just as proficient in his MOS as is the Active Army soldier.

SECTION FIVE

The next items concern YOUR EXPERIENCES WITH YOUR FELLOW SOLDIERS IN YOUR PRESENT PLATOON/SECTION. After each item, a set of response alternatives is provided. For each item, select the response that best describes your opinion. *Circle the letter in front of the response that you choose.*

92. In general, how do you feel about the people you work with?
- a I like them a lot.
 - b I think they are OK.
 - c I do not like them very much.
 - d I do not like them at all.
93. In my unit, most of the soldiers care about what happens to each other.
- a strongly agree
 - b agree
 - c not sure
 - d disagree
 - e strongly disagree
94. I do not trust the other soldiers in my unit.
- a agree
 - b not really sure
 - c disagree
95. Do the soldiers in your unit make each other feel like doing a good job?
- a very much
 - b much
 - c somewhat
 - d little
 - e very little, not at all
96. How well do the soldiers in your unit work together?
- a very well
 - b well
 - c borderline
 - d poorly
 - e very poorly
97. On the average, how well do the soldiers you work with do their jobs?
- a very well
 - b well
 - c borderline
 - d poorly
 - e very poorly
98. How many soldiers in your unit do you think are good soldiers?
- a all are
 - b most are
 - c some are
 - d very few are
 - e none are
99. How many soldiers in your unit perform so poorly that the unit might be better off without them?
- a all are
 - b most are
 - c some are
 - d very few are

- e none are
- 100. How often do the members of your unit work hard to get things done?
 - a always
 - b most of the time
 - c sometimes
 - d seldom
 - e never
- 101. I would recommend my unit to my friends.
 - a strongly agree
 - b agree
 - c borderline
 - d disagree
 - e strongly disagree
- 102. My unit is the best in the battalion.
 - a strongly agree
 - b agree
 - c borderline
 - d disagree
 - e strongly disagree
- 103. New soldiers are quickly made to feel they are part of the unit.
 - a strongly agree
 - b agree
 - c borderline
 - d disagree
 - e strongly disagree
- 104. Pay and Personnel Administration is good in my unit.
 - a strongly agree
 - b agree
 - c borderline
 - d disagree
 - e strongly disagree
- 105. I spend a lot of time socializing with other members of my unit after drill.
 - a very often
 - b often
 - c sometimes
 - d rarely
 - e never
- 106. In my unit, working hard is rewarded.
 - a strongly agree
 - b agree
 - c borderline
 - d disagree
 - e strongly disagree
- 107. In my unit, you don't have to watch your belongings.
 - a strongly agree
 - b agree
 - c borderline
 - d disagree

e strongly disagree

108. On the whole, the morale of my unit is usually high.

a strongly agree

b agree

c borderline

d disagree

e strongly disagree

109. On the whole, the training in my unit is usually good.

a strongly agree

b agree

c borderline

d disagree

e strongly disagree

SECTION SIX

The next items concern YOUR EXPERIENCES WITH THE LEADERS IN YOUR PRESENT PLATOON/SECTION--OFFICERS AND NCOs. After each item, a set of response alternatives is provided. For each item, select the response that best describes your opinion. *Circle the letter in front of the response that you choose.*

110. When I go for help, my immediate leader listens well and cares about what I say.
- a always
 - b most of the time
 - c sometimes
 - d not very often
111. My immediate leader really understands the soldiers in the unit.
- a strongly agree
 - b agree
 - c neither agree nor disagree
 - d disagree
 - e strongly disagree
112. When I want to talk, my immediate leader makes himself available.
- a always
 - b most of the time
 - c sometimes
 - d not very often
 - e never
113. Overall, my immediate leader does a very good job.
- a strongly agree
 - b somewhat agree
 - c borderline
 - d somewhat disagree
 - e strongly disagree
114. My immediate leader is such a good soldier, he can show us how to best perform our tasks.
- a strongly agree
 - b agree
 - c borderline
 - d disagree
 - e strongly disagree
115. My immediate leader makes me feel like a "winner" when I do something well.
- a strongly agree
 - b agree
 - c borderline
 - d disagree
 - e strongly disagree
116. The leaders in this unit know their stuff.
- a strongly agree
 - b agree
 - c borderline
 - d disagree
 - e strongly disagree
117. If we went to war tomorrow, I would feel confident about going with the leaders in my unit.
- a strongly agree

- b agree
- c borderline
- d disagree
- e strongly disagree

118. How often do you talk to your immediate leaders about your personal problems?

- a always
- b often
- c sometimes
- d rarely
- e never

119. Overall, how much does it help to talk to your immediate leaders about your personal problems?

- a makes things much better
- b makes things better
- c makes no difference
- d makes things worse
- e makes things a lot worse
- f. does not apply: I do not discuss my personal problems with my immediate leaders in the Guard.

120. How often do you talk to your immediate leaders about your Army Guard professional/job problems?

- a always
- b often
- c sometimes
- d rarely
- e never

121. Overall, how much does it help to talk with your immediate leaders about your Army Guard professional/job problems?

- a makes things much better
- b makes things better
- c makes no difference
- d makes things worse
- e makes things a lot worse
- f. does not apply: I do not discuss my Army Guard professional/job problems with my

immediate leaders in the Army Guard.

122. The soldiers in this unit would be disappointed in me if I did not complete my enlistment.

- a strongly agree
- b agree
- c not sure
- d disagree
- e strongly disagree

123. How often are you concerned about what might happen to you personally if your unit went into combat?

- a very often
- b often
- c occasionally
- d hardly ever
- e never

124. How often do the soldiers in your unit discuss with each other their concerns about going into combat?

- a very often
- b often

- c occasionally
- d hardly ever
- e never

125. How often do your leaders talk to you about going into combat?

- a very often
- b often
- c occasionally
- d hardly ever
- e never

126. How long have you had the same immediate leader?

- a less than 1 year
- b 1 to 2 years
- c 2 to 4 years
- d 4 to 6 years
- e over 6 years

SECTION SEVEN

Choose the response that best describes you and **CIRCLE THE LETTER IN FRONT OF THE APPROPRIATE ITEM.**

AA. Which racial or ethnic group do you consider yourself a member of?

- a Aleut
- b American Indian
- c Black
- d Chinese
- e Cuban
- f Filipino
- g Guamanian
- h Hawaiian
- i Hispanic
- j Japanese
- k Korean
- l Mexican-American
- m Puerto Rican
- n Samoan
- o White, Non-Hispanic
- p Other

BB. What is your marital status?

- a I am single, never married.
- b I am engaged to be married.
- c I am married.
- d I am separated, but not legally divorced.
- e I am divorced.
- f I am widowed.

CC. Number of children:

- a 0
- b 1
- c 2
- d 3
- e 4 or more

DD. How long have you been in the Army National Guard?

- a Less than 1 year
- b 1 to 2 years
- c 2 to 4 years
- d 4 to 6 years

..... e Over 6 years

EE. How much Active Duty service do you have?

- a Less than 1 year
- b 1 to 2 years
- c 2 to 4 years
- d 4 to 6 years
- e Over 6 years

FF. How long have you been in your present unit?

- a Less than 1 year
- b 1 to 2 years

- c 2 to 4 years
- d 4 to 6 years
- e Over 6 years

GG. What is your present military grade?

- a E-4 or below
- b E-5
- c E-6
- d E-7
- e E-8
- f E-9
- g O-1
- h O-2
- i O-3
- j O-4
- k O-5
- l Warrant Officer

HH. Are you Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) or Military Technician?

- a Active Guard/Reserve (AGR)
- b Military Technician
- c Neither

II. Are you a non-commissioned officer (NCO)?

- a Yes
- b No

JJ. Please identify your platoon. _____

KK. Please identify your company. _____